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PRIVATE OR PUBLIC APPROACHES




While the United States, virtually alone amnong developed countries, relies primarily
on private health insurance to deliver access to health care services, private health
insurance is not unknown elsewhere in the world. In this Article, 7mothy lost
surveys the mixed public and private health insurance systems of Australia, Chile,
Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as the largely public systems of Canada,
France and the United Kingdom. He shows that countries that place significant
reliance on private health insurance also regulate the private insurance market
heavily; only where private insurance merely supplements universal public insur-
ance is the private market largely unregulated. Professor Jost concludes from his
comparative analysis that market-reliant systems are unlikely to reduce the gro wing
number of Americans who are uninsured, and that tie differences betwveen highly
regulated private insurance systems and largely public insurance systems are less
pronounced than generally assumed. While the United States politically is unlikely
to move towards public insurance, he writes, a turn towards greater privatization
would tend to worsen, rather than improve, tie problem of tie uninsured.
INTRODUCTION
There is no more pressing health policy issue facing America to-
day than the problem of the uninsured. In 1999, 42.6 million Ameri-
cans, almost 15.5% of the population, were covered neither by private
nor by public health insurance.' It is estimated that as many as 61.4
* Newton D. Baker, Baker and Hostetler Professor, College of Law, and Professor,
College of Medicine and Public Health, The Ohio State University-, Visiting Professor of
Law, Spring 2000, Washington and Lee University. B.A., 1970, University of California,
Santa Cruz; J.D., 1975, University of Chicago. I would like to thank many people who
offered helpful comments as this Article went through successive incarnations, including
faculty members of the Schools of Law at Washington and Lee and Wake Forest Univer-
sity, who attended seminars based on this material, and, in particular, Randy Bovbjerg,
Mark Hall, Clark Havighurst, Ted Marmor, Kieke G.H. Okma, and Victor Rodvin. I am
very grateful to many gracious people whom I interviewed in Santiago, Chile in the sum-
mer of 1998 and in Melbourne, Canberra, and Sydney, Australia in the fall of 1999, and, in
particular, Rubi Valenzuela Magafia and Andrea Mufloz Sanchez of the Superintendencia
de Instituciones de Salud Previsional in Chile. Appreciation is also due to Phillipe Pouyet
and Claude Le Pen from France; Annette van den Bosch from the Netherlands; Andreas
Besche from Germany, and Paul Fenn and Charles Webster from England who provided
me with sources and information, and to Pierrick Le Goff who assisted with translation.
1 Number of Uninsured Drops for First Tme in 12 Years, Census Bureau Report Says,
Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), Sept. 29, 2000, WVL 912912000 HCD d6.
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million Americans could be uninsured by the year 2009 if the econ-
omy takes a downturn.2 Although being uninsured in America does
not mean that one is totally denied access to health care, a large and
growing body of research shows that persons who are uninsured get
less health care, get it later, and suffer greater mortality and morbidity
because of their failure to receive health care in a timely fashion.3
In the recent past a remarkably broad consensus has emerged as
to how to address this problem. In March of 1999, Republican Con-
gressman Charles Norwood of Georgia introduced his Affordable
Health Care Act,4 proposing tax credits and insurance reform to in-
crease access to private health insurance for the uninsured.5 Early in
June of 1999, a "coalition of researchers spanning the ideological spec-
trum" endorsed the idea of health care tax credits for the uninsured.6
Later that same month, House Majority Leader Richard Armey sub-
mitted his Fair Care for the Uninsured Act of 19997 proposing tax
credits to make private health insurance more affordable to the unin-
sured.8 In September 1999, Vice President and then-presidential can-
didate Al Gore proposed a twenty-five percent refundable tax credit
to assist employees in purchasing health insurance. 9 A couple of
2 Steven Findlay & Joel Miller, Nat'l Coalition on Health Care, Down a Dangerous
Path: The Erosion of Health Insurance Coverage in the United States (1999), http://
www.nchc.org/releases/erosion.html.
3 Am. Soc'y of Internal Med., Am. Coll. of Physicians, No Health Insurance? It's
Enough to Make You Sick-Scientific Research Linking the Lack of Health Coverage to
Poor Health 4 (1999), http://www.acponline.org/uninsured/lack-contents.htm (reviewing
124 scientific studies published in past decade); E. Richard Brown, Access to Health Insur-
ance in the United States, 46 Med. Care Rev. 349, 352-53 (1989) (finding that uninsured
have less access to medical care and are less likely to see physician than are insured peo-
ple); Peter Franks et al., Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from a National Co-
hort, 270 JAMA 737, 740 (1993) (finding that uninsured's risk of mortality is 1.25 times
norm).
4 Affordable Health Care Act of 1999, H.R. 1136, 106th Cong. (1999).
5 Norwood Offers Proposal to Help Uninsured Through Tax Credits, Affordability
Measures, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), Mar. 17, 1999 (reporting that Representative
Norwood's Affordable Health Care Act would provide refundable tax credit of up to
$3600 per family to increase access to private health insurance), WL 3/17/1999 HCD d6.
6 "Consensus Group" Endorses Tax Credits as Key to Covering Uninsured Ameri-
cans, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), June 3, 1999, WL 6/3/1999 HCD d3; see also Health
Policy Consensus Group, A Vision for Consumer-Driven Health Care Reform, in Empow-
ering Health Care Consumers Through Tax Reform 211, 217-18 (Grace-Marie Arnett ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Empowering Consumers]. The entities from which the individuals in
this consensus group were drawn in fact represent primarily the right end of the political
spectrum.
7 Fair Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999, H.R. 2362, 106th Cong. (1999).
8 Armey Introduces Health Care Tax Credit Bill to Subsidize Coverage for Uninsured
People, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), June 28, 1999 (reporting Representative Armey's
proposal of tax credits to help purchase of health insurance), WL 6/28/1999 HCD d6.
9 Candidate Gore Calls for Tax Credit Aimed at Health Care Uninsured, Health Care
Daily Rep. (BNA), Sept. 8, 1999 (reporting that presidential candidate Al Gore would
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weeks later, then-presidential candidate Senator Bill Bradley came
forth with his own health reform proposal: expanding health insur-
ance coverage through tax credits.10 Five of the eight proposals put
forward by health care trade and consumer advocacy associations at a
conference on the uninsured in January 2000 included, again, propos-
als for tax credits." Later that month, a bipartisan group of Senate
and House members outlined a new health reform plan based on-
you guessed it-refundable tax credits.12 Most recently, two powerful
health care interest groups, the American Association of Health Plans
(AAHP) and the American Medical Association (AMA), rolled out
tax credit proposals.' 3 Even Harry and Louise, the charming couple
that helped bring down the Clinton health plan in 1994, have now
gone public with a positive message: Expand coverage for the unin-
sured through changes in the tax code.
14
Though these proposals vary in their details, they all proceed
from the assumption that the best way to expand access to health care
for the uninsured is to build on our current system of private insur-
ance, which now covers seventy percent of our population, even if the
only way this can be accomplished is through increased public subsi-
dies. 15 No observer of American health policy should find this sur-
prising. As Carolyn Tuohy has argued in her brilliant book Accidental
Logics, the development of health care systems is "path dependent."'
6
introduce twenty-five percent refundable tax credit for people who do not have health
insurance through employers), WL 9/811999 HCD d6.
10 Bradley Unveils Proposal That Would Cover All Children, Expand Medicare, Health
Care Daily Rep. (BNA), Sept. 29, 1999 (introducing former Senator Bradley's proposal to
provide subsidies to families for health care coverage in form of tax credits), WVL 9J29)1999
HCD d9.
11 See Robert Wood Johnson Found., Health Coverage 2000: Meeting the Challenge of
the Uninsured (comparing various proposals), http://ww.nvf.orgnv._nesand_eventsf
eventshc2000lside-by-side.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
12 Bipartisan Group of Lawmakers Outlines Plan for Health Care Tax Credits for Un-
insured, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), Jan. 27, 2000 (discussing bipartisan proposal to
provide up to $2000 in tax credits for health insurance), WL 1/27/2000 HCD dS.
13 AAHP Proposes Medicaid Expansion, Tax Credit to Increase Insurance Coverage,
Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), Mar. 2, 2000 (reporting on AAHP's tax credit proposal).
WL 3/2/2000 HCD dli; AMA Delegates Approve Guidelines for Crafting Tax Credits for
the Uninsured, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), June 14, 2000, WL 614I200) HCD dll.
14 Richard Lacayo, Health Care: A Litmus Test: In the Primaries, What the Front
Runners Say (or Don't Say) About It Says a Lot About Them, Time, Jan. 31, 20 , at 38,
38. Other entities pushing tax credit solutions include the Heritage Foundation. See
Grace-Marie Arnett, Rising Costs, Reduced Access: How Regulation Harms Health Con-
sumers and the Uninsured 9 (Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1307, 1999).
15 A comprehensive summary of current proposals is found in Randall Weiss & Mark
Garay, Recent Tax Proposals to Increase Health Insurance Coverage (2000).
16 Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health
Care Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada 6-7 (1999) (introducing notion of
recurrence of "path dependence" in dynamics of change in health policy).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The structures that nations develop for providing and paying for
health care, though largely the products of historical accidents, take
on a powerful logic of their own that is very difficult subsequently to
escape or even to change, except perhaps incrementally at the mar-
gins.17 Our system of health care finance has been based on private
health insurance since the first half of the last century, and only under
highly unusual circumstances, such as the Democratic landslide of
1964, has it been possible even to contemplate expansion of public
health care financing programs.
18
Many of these proposals, however, do not simply embrace private
insurance, but also articulate a specific vision as to how private insur-
ance markets should be structured. That vision is based on two fur-
ther beliefs. First, most of the proposals favor highly atomized
insurance markets. Their ideal is a market in which every individual
chooses his or her own health plan.19 They abandon the traditional
American approach, under which the vast majority of Americans have
had group (rather than individual) coverage provided through an em-
ployee benefits plan.20 This change is often presented as part of the
package of the move from tax deductions to credits but is not a neces-
sary concomitant of such a change. One could have group insurance
17 See id. at 6, 260-62.
18 See Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare 1-85 (2d ed. 1999); Tuohy, supra
note 16, at 56-58. By the same token, once the National Health Service (NHS) became
embedded in Great Britain, even the Thatcher government was unable to change its funda-
mentals. Id. at 39-41, 63-71.
19 See, e.g., John C. Goodman & Merrill Matthews, Reforming the U.S. Health Care
System (Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Policy Backgrounder No. 149, 1999), www.ncpa.org/
bgfbgl49/bg149.html; John S. Hoff, Improving the System for Delivering Subsidies: Cap or
Scrap the Exclusion?, in Empowering Consumers, supra note 6, at 93; Robert Emmet Mof-
fit, High Anxiety: Working Families Need Market-Based Health Care Reform, in Empow-
ering Consumers, supra note 6, at 35. This also seems to be the ideal for Richard Epstein,
who eschews all forms of cross-subsidization. See Richard A. Epstein, Mortal Peril 121-27
(1997).
20 See Melissa A. Thomasson, The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy
Shaped U.S. Health Insurance 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7543, 2000) (tracing history of this phenomenon). These proposals for change are not
driven by public opinion, which is highly supportive of the current system of employer-
based benefits. In one recent survey, forty-nine percent of adults surveyed supported em-
ployers as the main source of coverage, as compared to twenty-three percent who favored
direct purchase; further, seventy-three percent of adults with job-based coverage felt that
their employers did a "good job" of choosing plans, while only twelve percent felt that
their employers did a "bad job." Lisa Duchon et al., Listening to Workers: Challenges for
Employer-Sponsored Coverage in the 21st Century 2 (2000). Another recent study found
Americans more evenly divided on the choice between employer-based insurance and indi-
vidual tax credits, but also found that our employer-based health insurance system remains
very popular. See Robert J. Blendon et al., The Uninsured, the Working Uninsured, and
the Public, Health Aff., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 203, 203, 208.
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plans paid for by tax credits.21 Second, some of the more extreme
advocates of reform support not only private insurance markets, but
also largely unregulated markets. This position is seen, on the one
hand, in extreme libertarians, such as Richard Epstein, 2 and on the
other hand, in statements made by insurance or health plan industry
associations, which generally favor deregulation of the markets in
which they sell their products33 Though many advocates of the tax
credit approach recognize that access to health insurance can only be
expanded in regulated markets, most would limit the role of
regulation.24
21 This is, in fact, one of the major elements of a proposal just recently put forward by
Families USA and the Health Insurance Association of America. See Charles N. Kahn II
& Ronald F. Pollack, Building a Consensus for Expanding Health Coverage, Health Aff.,
JaniFeb. 2001, at 40, 45; see also C. Eugene Steuerle & Gordon B.T. Mermin, A Better
Subsidy for Health Insurance?, in Empowering Consumers, supra note 6, at 71 (contem-
plating continued role for employers to negotiate health plans in tax credit-based system).
22 Epstein, supra note 19, at 52-54, 121-46; see also, Arnett, supra note 14, at 6-7, 9
(advocating consumer choice and moratorium on health insurance regulation); Norman B.
Ture & Stephen J. Entin, Health Care Reform: Why Not Try Real Insurance?, in Empow-
ering Consumers, supra note 6, at 119 (proposing supplantation of government regulation
of health care by free market system).
23 See, e.g., Key Patients' Protections: Lessons from the Field: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Karen M. Ignagni, President and CEO, American Ass'n of Health Plans) (arguing that
regulation has "unintended consequence of decreasing quality and increasing costs"), 1999
WL 8085434; William S. Custer, Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Health Insurance Coverage and
the Uninsured 4, 16-18 (1998) (finding that regulation reforms have increased number of
uninsured Americans); John Berry & Richard White, An Insurer's Perspective on Reform,
25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 205, 209 (2000) (arguing that different forms of regulation
encourage adverse selection). Health insurers oppose, in particular, state benefit man-
dates, which they would like to see preempted by federal law. See Health Ins. Ass'n of
Am. (HLAA), InsureUSA, at http/www.rwjf~org/rw-nesand-eventsfeventshc2O!G!
hiaa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). Insurers generally argue that the presence of regula-
tion increases the cost of insurance, and thus decreases its availability. There seems to be
considerable support for this argument, though the extent of the phenomenon is debated.
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAOIHEHS-98-203R, Private Health Insur-
ance: Impact of Premium Increases on the Number of Covered Individuals Is Uncertain
(1998) (discussing arguments regarding extent to which increases in health insurance costs
lead to decreases in number of persons covered).
24 See Stuart M. Butler, Expanding Health Insurance Through Tax Reform 2 (1999)
(proposing neutral tax reform that would grant tax relief to families allowing them to
choose their own health plans regardless of source of plans); Alain C. Enthoven, Health
Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care 7882. 126-30
(1980) (supporting choice in health care through market system, subject to limited govern-
ment regulation). For reasons elaborated below, infra text accompanying notes 350-64, tax
credits, without some limitations on underwriting or adjustment in the size of credits for
risk status, are not capable of extending health insurance to those whose health status is
poor, see Mark Merlis, Public Subsidies and Private Markets: Coverage Expansions in the
Current Insurance Environment 7 (1999) (illustrating that fixed dollar subsidies that would
enable lower-risk individuals to obtain health insurance may be insufficient to make cover-
age affordable for higher-risk individuals who are subject to higher premiums); Linda
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All three of these beliefs-the superiority of private insurance
markets, the preferability of individual as opposed to group health in-
surance markets, and the need for (and possibility of) deregulation of
insurance markets-are contestable based on comparative research.
As every observer of comparative health policy knows, we are the
only developed nation on Earth that relies primarily on private health
insurance to finance health care, though virtually every other nation
on Earth has a private health insurance industry.25 We spend a
greater share of our wealth on health care, yet have a higher propor-
tion of our people without assured access to it, than does any other
developed nation.26 Indeed, a recent evaluation of the world's health
care systems, comparing them on the basis of support for good health,
responsiveness to the public's expectations, and fairness of financial
contribution, ranked the United States at thirty-seventh.2 7
Reasonable persons, of course, can argue as to whether the vir-
tues of our market-based health care system-and there are many-
justify its high cost and glaring deficiencies.28 Reasonable persons
Blumberg, Are Tax Credits the Right Track to Take?, in Options for Expanding Health
Insurance Coverage: A Report on a Policy Roundtable 34, 34-35 (Judith Feder & Sheila
Burke eds., 1999) (noting that high-risk uninsureds would be unable to obtain health insur-
ance in unregulated markets if tax credits were too small). Though responsible advocates
of tax credits recognize this issue, they often give the problem short shrift in discussions
that tend to focus on other implementation issues, such as the relationship between pro-
posed credits and current deductions. See, e.g., Butler, supra, at 10 (examining infeasibility
of calculating tax credits against withholdings for unemployed people); Mark Pauly, Ex-
tending Health Insurance Through Tax Credits 3 (1999) (discussing interplay between cur-
rent exclusions and proposed tax credits).
25 See, e.g., Karen Davis, International Health Policy: Common Problems, Alternative
Strategies, Health Aff., May/June 1999, at 135, 141.
26 For recent data, see Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending and Outcomes:
Trends in OECD Countries, 1960-1998, Health Aff., May/June 2000, at 150, 151 (noting
that in 1998, United States spent $4270 per capita and fourteen percent of GDP on health
care, compared to OECD median of $2000 per capita and eight percent of GDP); Karen
Donelan et al., The Cost of Health System Change: Public Discontent in Five Nations,
Health Aft., May/June 1999, at 206, 209-10 (noting that fourteen percent of Americans
surveyed report that there was time in past twelve months when they needed medical care
but could not get it, compared to ten percent of Britons and Canadians surveyed); see also
John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311, 315 n.19 (1997)
(citing sources on uniqueness of U.S. health insurance system).
27 World Health Org., The World Health Report 2000, at 155 (2000).
28 The American people are well aware of these deficiencies. One public opinion sur-
vey, for example, found that Americans are more likely to rate the quality of health care in
their community to be fair or poor and to agree with the statement that their health care
system involves too much bureaucracy than are Canadians or Germans. Robert J. Blendon
et al., Who Has the Best Health Care System? A Second Look, Health Aff., Winter 1995,
at 220, 223-24. Americans were also much more likely to have problems paying medical
bills or to forego care because of cost. Id.; see also Karen Donelan et al., All Payer, Single
Payer, Managed Care, No Payer: Patients' Perspectives in Three Nations, Health Aff.,
Summer 1996, at 254, 257-62 (analyzing same survey).
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certainly can point to the many problems faced by publicly financed
systems.29 But what is remarkable about those who argue so passion-
ately for pouring more public money into our highly problematic sys-
tem of private health insurance is how few of them engage in this
discussion. Most seem simply oblivious to (and some profoundly ig-
norant of) the experience of the rest of the world with respect to
health care finance.30 Given the oft-noted reality that we live in an
era of globalization, this is remarkable.
Perhaps, however, it is not so remarkable. Most of those who
argue for tax credits are focused myopically on the vaunted merits of
tax credits versus tax deductions as a vehicle for encouraging ex-
panded insurance coverage, and ignore other alternatives. 31 Others
paint a very grim picture of the health care systems of the rest of the
world as failed socialist experiments.32 This is not universally true.
Some private insurance advocates, in fact, have considered seriously
the relative merits of private versus public insurance systems, and con-
29 See, e.g., Julian Beltrame, To Ease Crisis in Health Care, Canadians Eye Private
Sector, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 2000, at B1; Sarah Lyall, In Britain's Health Service, Sick Itself,
Cancer Care Is Dismal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
30 For example, the more than two hundred pages of Epstein's Mortal Peril devoted to
the issue of access to health care makes only one brief and unsupported negative reference
to the Canadian system, and one brief reference to the British system. See Epstein, supra
note 19, at 48, 78. One of the fev tax credit advocates who advert to the comparative
question suggests that health care costs are higher in the United States because of our
aging population, yet is seemingly oblivious to the fact that we have one of the youngest
populations of OECD nations. See Michael Tanner, What's Wrong with the Present Sys-
tem, in Empowering Consumers, supra note 6, at 27. Such ignorance of other countries'
health care systems is, of course, not universal. A number of serious scholars who support
private health care finance, including, for example, Mark Pauly and Alain Enthoven, are
quite familiar with publicly financed systems. See Alain C. Enthoven, In Pursuit of an
Improving National Health Service, Health Aff., May/June 2000, at 102; Jurg Finsinger,
Kornelius Kraft & Mark Pauly, Some Observations on Greater Competition in the West
German Health-Insurance System from a U.S. Perspective, 7 Managerial & Decision Econ.
151 (1986).
31 If our only choice were between subsidizing private insurance through tax deduc-
tions, on the one hand, and tax credits, on the other, the arguments for the latter approach
would be formidable. See, e.g., Jack A. Meyer et al., Tax Reform to Expand Health Cover-
age: Administrative Issues and Challenges 7-10, 23-24 (2000). On the other hand, our
system of tax exclusions and deductions has served us reasonably well as a means of ex-
tending health insurance coverage, and a system of tax credits may not perform much
better. See Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Costs
and Benefits, Health Aff., JaniFeb. 2000, at 72,77-78 (finding that tax credits would reduce
number of uninsureds only slightly).
32 See, e.g., Grace-Marie Arnett, Introduction and Overview. Empowering Health
Care Consumers Through Tax Reform, in Empowering Consumers, supra note 6, at xxv,
xxvi ("The social welfare programs-including national health insurance-that had prolif-
erated around the world during the twentieth century were bankrupting governments,
sending taxes ever higher, and forcing government rationing and other limitations on
health services.").
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cluded that private systems perform better given the models they ap-
ply.33 This also is not surprising. Public insurance programs are
indeed plagued by inefficiencies and shortages that easily could con-
vince the casual observer that private systems are superior. Free mar-
ket advocates easily can fall prey to the "Nirvana Fallacy" of
comparing their models of perfect individual-purchaser-based free
markets to the real world failings of public alternatives, or group
health insurance markets, or even regulated insurance markets.3 4
It is not obvious, however, that private systems for financing
health care services are indeed superior to public systems.35 It is also
far from clear that individual-purchaser-based insurance markets
work better than group markets, or that private insurance markets can
function without a heavy overlay of regulation. To begin, the whole
point of paying for health care services is to make health care availa-
ble. Any expenditure for administering health insurance systems is
deadweight loss, unless it results in better, cheaper, or more accessible
or responsive health care services. The direct administrative costs of
public systems tend to be quite low.36 Public systems simply collect
funds through taxes and pay the money to providers for services pro-
33 See Health Care Policy and Politics: Lessons from Four Countries (Robert B. Helms
ed., 1993). Compare Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs: Is Canada's System
Really Less Expensive?, Health Aft., Spring 1992, at 21 (concluding that administrative
costs really are higher in Canada than in United States), with Morris L. Barer & Robert G.
Evans, Interpreting Canada: Models, Mind-Sets, and Myths, Health Aff., Spring 1992, at
44 (responding critically to Danzon's article).
34 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
Econ. 1, 1-4 (1969) (discussing Nirvana Fallacy). Patricia Danzon's article on the Canadian
system is a classic example of this. Indeed, she admits at the outset that she is comparing
ideal public monopoly and competitive private models, but drawing on experience from
the Canadian system and ignoring the inefficiencies that actually exist in the United States
because of tax and regulatory policy. Danzon, supra note 33, at 23. In sum, her article
compares a worst-case version of the actual Canadian system with an ideal American sys-
tem. This fact was noted at the time by Canadian economists who critiqued her article.
Barer & Evans, supra note 33, at 53.
35 Neither is it at all clear that health care services are of higher quality in the United
States than in other developed nations. See, e.g., Gerard F. Anderson, In Search of Value:
An International Comparison of Cost, Access, and Outcomes, Health Aff., Nov./Dec.
1997, at 163, 169-70; Leslie L. Roos et al., Health and Surgical Outcomes in Canada and
the United States, Health Aff., Summer 1992, at 56, 57.
36 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There
a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 7 (1999) (comparing
percentage of premiums used to pay administration costs by private U.S. insurers to signifi-
cantly lower percentages for public health programs in United States and Germany);
Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative Effi-
ciency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1253, 1253 (1991). But see
Randall R. Bovbjerg, The High Cost of Administration in Health Care: Part of the Prob-
lem or Part of the Solution?, 23 J.L. Med. & Ethics 186, 189 (1995) (book review) (offering
cautions with respect to making international comparisons of administrative costs).
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vided. Public systems in most countries guarantee access for all,3 7 and
also control costs reasonably effectively. They also have available the
same mechanisms for assuring quality that are available in private
systems.3 8
The transaction costs of private insurance systems are at the out-
set much higher than those of public systems, and the administrative
costs of individual policies are much higher than those of group poli-
cies.39 Private insurers must incur marketing costs (including often
substantial sales commissions) and underwriting costs, which are much
higher for individual policies than for group policies.40 Administrative
"loads" can amount to thirty-five to forty percent in the individual
market.41 Commissions for policy sales alone often run in the ten to
twenty percent range for initial sales, and around five percent for re-
newals. 42 Private insurers are not able to control costs by imposing
global budgets and rather must review individual claims or negotiate
37 See Anderson, supra note 35, at 167-68 (noting that United States has lowest per-
centage of coverage of twenty-nine countries surveyed); Donelan et al., supra note 26, at
208-09 (noting that United States is only nation surveyed that does not have universal
insurance).
38 See Davis, supra note 25, at 139-41. Quality is addressed at many levels in countries
with national health services such as the United Kingdom's. See Richard B. Saltman,
Thinking About Planned Markets and F'xed Budgets, in Fixing Health Budgets: Experi-
ence from Europe and North America 3, 6-10 (Friedrich Wilhelm Schwartz et al. eds.,
1996) (discussing possibility of quality-based planned markets). See generally Judith
Allsop & Linda Mulcahy, Regulating Medical Work, Formal and Informal Controls (1996)
(discussing mechanisms for quality control in British NHS system); The International Jour-
nal for Quality in Health Care (discussing efforts at quality assurance in health care in
various countries).
39 See H.R. Doc. No. 90-757, at 45-46, 51-52 (1989) (explaining that administrative
costs, as percentage of total costs, vary inversely with number of people covered under
plan); see also Jost, supra note 36, at 7-8; George Schieber & Akiko Maeda, A Curmud-
geon's Guide to Financing Health Care in Developing Countries, in Innovations in Health
Care Financing 1, 30-31 (George J. Schieber ed., 1997); John F. Sheis et al., 0 Canada: Do
We Expect Too Much from Its Health System?, Health Aft, Spring 1992, at 7, 10-12;
Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 36, at 1256-57.
40 These costs may equal as much as forty percent of premiums for small groups, and as
little as six percent of premiums for the large group policies. Mark A. Hall, Reforming
Private Health Insurance 21 (1994); see also Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance
Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Ohio St. LJ. 835, 863-69
(1986) (discussing insurance transaction costs).
41 Two recent studies found loading ratios (the percentage of premiums not spent on
benefits) to equal seventeen percent for group policies and from thirty-three to forty per-
cent for individual policies. Mark V. Pauly & Allison M. Percy, Cost and Performance: A
Comparison of the Individual and Group Health Insurance Markets, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y
& L. 9, 18-20 (2000). A third study put the ratio at thirty-four percent for group policies
and forty-three percent for individual policies. Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health
Insurance Regulation, Health Aft., Mar/Apr. 2000, at 173, 175.
42 Deborah J- Chollet & Adele M. Kirk, Understanding Individual Health Insurance
Markets: Structure, Practices, and Products in Ten States 54-55 (1998).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
discounts or risk-sharing agreements with providers at considerable
cost.43 Private insurers charge a "risk premium," beyond the cost of
expected loss, for assuming the risk of loss which is transferred from
insureds, which, again, is usually much higher for individual policies. 44
Where individuals or small groups are insured, this risk premium can
become quite large (approaching ten percent of premiums), because
the risk becomes so uncertain.45 Finally, there is the real, though un-
quantifiable, cost of the anxiety that many Americans suffer either
because they do not have private insurance or because they face a
realistic possibility of losing it.46 If one is going to use public money to
pay for private insurance, one must ask: Where is the added value
that justifies the inevitable added costs of private insurance?
Advocates of private insurance argue that it truly does offer ad-
ded value. Private insurance, they contend, can respond creatively,
flexibly, and efficiently to consumer demand.47 Private systems en-
able consumers to choose the health plan that best meets their needs
43 See Barer & Evans, supra note 33, at 56-57; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sandra J.
Tanenbaum, Selling Cost Containment, 19 Am. J.L. & Med. 95, 107-09 (1993) (comparing
global budgetary and micromanagerial methods of cost containment). The individual ap-
proach to utilization review typical of American insurers also imposes high costs on health
care providers and professionals, who constantly must contend with it. See Jost, supra note
36, at 7-8, 17. John Sheils, Gary Young, and Robert Rubin argue that global budgeting
may not be as successful in the United States as it is in other nations because of our consti-
tutional commitment to due process. Sheils et al., supra note 39, at 17-18. A close exami-
nation of the role of the courts in our Medicare system, on the other hand, demonstrates
that the courts in fact play a minimal role in our largest public health care financing pro-
gram and have not proved a major impediment to achieving program goals. See Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 39, 45-65 (1999) (detailing Supreme
Court deference to Health Care Financing Administration in Medicare cases and how this
deference guides lower court decisions).
44 Hall, supra note 40, at 6; Sheils et al., supra note 39, at 11 (citing difficulty in predict-
ing covered claims for small group policies as one reason for greater risk/profit factor).
45 By contrast, with large groups the risk premium may be as low as one percent. Hall,
supra note 40, at 9.
46 Barer & Evans, supra note 33, at 54. Twenty-nine percent of Americans surveyed in
a recent survey either were uninsured or had been uninsured (or had a member of their
family uninsured) during the preceding three years, while an additional forty-three percent
personally knew someone who had gone without coverage. Robert Wood Johnson Found.,
Uninsured National Survey, Summary of Findings (1999), http://164.109.40.27/
rw_newsand_events/eventshc2000/bak-new/summary.htm. Twenty-six percent of those
surveyed reported that they or a family member had had to postpone receiving medical
treatment because of lack of insurance cover. Id. The anxiety caused by lack of insurance
is widespread. The fact that Americans frequently are required to change health plans
because of job changes or because their employer changes coverage leads to difficulties in
continuity of care and access to providers and also contributes to anxiety. See Duchon et
al., supra note 20, at 8 (explaining how reliance on employer-sponsored health plans cre-
ates insecurity in coverage).
47 See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, An Efficient and Equitable Approach to Health Reform, in
Empowering Consumers, supra note 6, at 55, 56-57; Pauly & Percy, supra note 41, at 9-10.
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and budgets rather than paying more for a one-size-fits-all plan. 48 Pri-
vately insured individuals are more or less free from the waiting lists
and shortages that plague public systems. 49 Private systems, it is ar-
gued, are better able than public systems to manage the cost and qual-
ity of health care;50 individual markets are more capable of harnessing
the forces of market competition to control the growth of health care
costs.5 1
These virtues are certainly present in economists' models, but do
they exist in the real world? The world provides a great deal of evi-
dence for comparing the performance of public and private health in-
surance systems. Excepting a handful of lingering hard-line
Communist countries, private health insurance exists everywhere.
48 Danzon, supra note 33, at 27 (concluding that diversity of options in private sstems
is in response to patient demand); Pauly, supra note 47, at 57 (arguing that allowing con-
sumers to find plan that suits their specific needs is most efficient).
49 Danzon, supra note 33, at 31-32. Arguably, the immediate availability that Ameri-
cans insist on from their health care system is one of the most important features of that
system. See Sherry Glied, Chronic Condition: Why Health Reform Fails 93-101 (1997)
(discussing importance of considering nonmonetary benefits, such as quick access to local
providers, when measuring health care costs); Jost, supra note 36, at 8-12 (comparing ac-
cess to medical services and speed of treatment in United States and Canada). Americans,
of course, also experience delays in treatment. The average number of days that patients
had to wait to see a specialist, according to one survey, was five in the United States,
fourteen in Canada, and four in Germany. Donelan et al., supra note 28, at 259. Moreo-
ver, waiting times in the United States may be getting worse for some patients. The same
survey found that sick, nonelderly persons in limited-choice managed care plans in the
United States waited, on average, seventeen days to see a doctor. Id. at 263.
50 Danzon, supra note 33, at 25-26 (arguing that competition creates incentives for in-
surers to promote risk-averse behavior in insureds and lower administrative costs). An-
other argument often made by some advocates of private insurance is that risk-based
pricing of insurance encourages risk-reducing behavior. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distrib-
uting Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy 77-79 (1986) (arguing that insur-
ance priced below expected cost discourages insureds from taking safety precautions);
Epstein, supra note 19, at 53-58, 125-26, 132-33 (same); Hall, supra note 40, at 29 (describ-
ing role of private markets in risk reduction). While the prospect of paying lower premi-
ums may induce employers to offer fitness programs, and even might encourage some
insureds to pursue healthier lifestyles, the issue is sharply contested, and Epstein offers no
empirical evidence to support what certainly seems to him to be a self-evident proposition.
See Robert L. Schwartz, Making Patients Pay for Their Life-Style Choices, 4 Cambridge Q.
Healthcare Ethics 393, 394-95 (1992) (disputing voluntariness of unhealthy lifestyles).
Obesity affects 19.7% of American men and 24.7% of American women (predominantly
privately insured), compared to 15% of English men and 16.5% of English women, and
1.8% of Japanese men and 2.6% of Japanese women (who are socially insured). Kumudini
Mayur, Obesity: A Growing Problem, Futurist, Oct. 1999, at 14, 14. Tobacco use, on the
other hand, is lower among Americans than it is in many other countries. See Barbara
Starfield, Is U.S. Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483, 483 (2000). Many
diseases, of course, are caused primarily by genetic or environmental factors that the in-
sured can do little to influence.
51 See Enthoven, supra note 24, at 89-92 (arguing that competition would "solve the
problem of health care costs").
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While no other country in the world has as high a proportion of the
population privately insured as does the United States 52 nearly thirty-
one percent of the population of Australia has private health insur-
ance, 53 and in Chile, where the Constitution guarantees citizens the
right to purchase private health insurance, over one-quarter of the
population has done so.5 4 In Germany and the Netherlands, only per-
sons whose incomes fall below a specified level must participate in the
public insurance program, while the remainder of the population is
free to purchase private insurance, or to go without insurance alto-
gether.55 In each of these countries, insurance is bought primarily by
individuals rather than for employee groups. Sophisticated private in-
surance concerns compete to insure the wealthy citizens of these
countries, who almost never choose to remain uninsured.5 6 Even
though universal coverage of most important health care services is
available in the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, many persons
purchase supplemental insurance to pay for noncovered services and
amenities, to obtain access to certain providers, or to avoid waiting
lists in the public sector.57
If one looks at private insurance markets throughout the world,
one striking fact emerges: There is a significant gap between the mod-
els of economists and the real world of private insurance. In particu-
lar, in countries that rely on private insurance as a primary means of
health care finance and where private insurance is sold predominantly
52 Arguably, a higher proportion of the population of Switzerland is privately insured.
Since late 1994, however, health insurance has been mandatory in Switzerland, and is now
denominated social insurance, though it is provided through private companies. Paul J.
Donahue, Federalism and the Financing of Health Care in Canada and Switzerland: Les-
sons for Health Care Reform in the United States, 21 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 385, 423-
24 (1998). Though this Article does not address insurance regulation in Switzerland, many
of the features discussed in this Article, such as limitations on premium underwriting and
government subsidies, are evident in Switzerland. Id. at 423-26.
Some have posited that South Korea has a high proportion of privately insured peo-
ple, but most experts agree that health insurance in Korea is described best as social insur-
ance. See Seung-Hum Yu & Gerard F. Anderson, Achieving Universal Health Insurance
in Korea: A Model for Other Developing Countries?, 20 Health Pol'y 289, 290 (1992)
(discussing history and features of health care in South Korea).
53 Private Health Ins. Admin. Council (PHIAC), Operations of the Registered Health
Benefits Organisations, Annual Report, 1998-99, at 1 (1999).
54 Rubi Valenzuela Magafia, Superintendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional
[Superintendency of Health Insurance Institutions] (SISP), An Overview of the Private
Health System in Chile 6 (1998).
55 See infra text accompanying notes 188-90, 265.
56 Insurance is not mandatory in Germany for those whose incomes exceed about
$3200 a month. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. However, only about 0.01% of
the population is uninsured. Comit6 Europ~en des Assurances (CEA), Health Insurance
in Europe 28 (1997).
57 See infra text accompanying notes 327-42.
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to individuals, insurance is almost without exception heavily regu-
lated, and often also government subsidized.58 True free markets for
private health insurance are certainly not the norm; indeed, they are
quite unusual. Only where private insurance is supplemental, cover-
ing nonessential services or duplicating public coverage, can insurance
markets that approximate competitive models be found.59
The rarity of free markets for private insurance, however, is not
the result of an accident. Private health insurance markets are at-
tended by serious and widely recognized market failures, which gener-
ally are exacerbated in individual markets and make public regulation
almost unavoidable. 60 The most common forms of regulation, how-
ever, introduce other problems, which in turn result in further regula-
tion and often in public subsidies as well. Only when private
insurance remains at the fringes of comprehensive public health care
finance programs is it likely to remain largely unregulated. Indeed,
even in the United States, the most libertarian of developed nations,
private health insurance has long been regulated and subsidized, and
the current policy initiatives, discussed above,61 would lead to more
regulation and more subsidies.62
If we are to apply a fair comparison, therefore, at least for aca-
demic purposes (again, I am not under the illusion that academic anal-
ysis here can result in real-world policy changes), we must compare
the relative merits of actual, highly regulated and subsidized private
insurance systems with public systems. When we do so, we find that
many of the proffered virtues of ideally competitive private insurance
markets, such as efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and responsiveness
to consumer demand, fade from view. Moreover, many of the theo-
retical and real-world deficiencies of public health care financing pro-
grams-their indifference to consumer desires and the inefficiencies
attendant on tax financing-are also apparent in real-world private
financing programs. 63 We also see that the level of regulation is much
higher when individual, as opposed to group, policies are involved.
Fimally, we generally see that private insurance programs pay more for
services-not less-than public programs.6 When we leave the nir-
vana of economic models and return to the real world, the superiority
58 See infra Part 11.
59 See infra Part 1.F.
60 See infra text accompanying notes 347-78.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
62 The current federal tax subsidy for private health insurance was worth Sl12 billion
in 1998. John Sheils & Paul Hogan, Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 1998, Health
Aff., Mar/Apr. 1999, at 176, 176.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 424-29.
64 See infra text accompanying notes 435-36.
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of private to public systems seems much less clear cut; indeed, public
programs may come out on top.
The goals of this paper are modest. I will attempt to describe the
private insurance regulatory environment of five nations-Australia,
Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States-in which
private, often individually purchased, insurance plays a prominent
role in health care finance and, much more briefly, of three nations-
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom-in which private, largely
group insurance plays a more marginal role. I then will examine why
the regulatory environment appears as it does. Finally, I will consider
how theoretical and empirical comparative analysis ought to proceed
in comparing public and private systems in the real world.
I
OPTIONS FOR PAYING FOR HEALTH CARE
Before we commence our comparative exploration of private and
public insurance systems, it may be useful first to elucidate the range
of options available for paying for health care. Five such options are
observable in the world's health care systems: out-of-pocket payment,
charitable provision, payroll tax-funded social insurance, general reve-
nue tax-based national health insurance systems, and private insur-
ance. Out-of-pocket direct payment and charitable provision were the
earliest approaches historically. Private charity continues to play an
important role in funding health services in developing nations, but it
is a marginal consideration in developed nations. 65 Out-of-pocket
payments are also a very important means of funding health care ser-
vices in less developed nations, and they continue to play an impor-
tant role in most developed countries. 66 In particular, they remain
important for funding consumer cost-sharing obligations and for
purchasing nonbasic services not covered by insurance, such as eye-
glasses or alternative medicine.67 In developed nations, however, es-
65 See Schieber & Maeda, supra note 39, at 30-31 (pointing out that charitable contri-
butions generally constitute "small portion of total health spending" in industrial
countries).
66 See George Schieber & Akiko Maeda, Health Care Financing and Delivery in De-
veloping Countries, Health Aff., May/June 1999, at 193, 200-03 (noting that as country's
per capita income increases, public funding finances larger share of health care services,
while private insurance is very limited in poorest countries).
67 During 1997, in the United States, for example, out-of-pocket payments funded
forty-nine percent of vision products and other medical durables and forty-seven percent
of dental care, but only three percent of hospital care and sixteen percent of physicians'
services. Bradley R. Braden et al., National Health Expenditures, 1997, 20 Health Care
Financing Rev. 83, 116 (1998) (tabulating data on types of health expenditures and sources
of funds).
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sential, high-cost services normally are funded by private or public
insurance rather than by out-of-pocket payments.
6s
It is obvious why health insurance has become so common. In
any given year, the burden of health care expenditures is extraordina-
rily concentrated on a small number of persons.69 Though large
health care expenditures are borne disproportionately by the elderly
and the chronically ill, even the young and healthy are at risk of suf-
fering accidents or diseases that easily could overwhelm their financial
capacity.70 Only the very wealthy, or the very poor, can afford to self-
insure for sickness and accident without risking financial disaster.7'
The purchase of health insurance is, therefore, a rational response to
generally unpredictable risk.72
Reliance on health insurance, however, goes beyond levels that
would seem rational. Many Americans, for example, purchase insur-
ance for routine expenditures, such as optical care or preventive den-
tal care, that are more or less predictable and easily could be managed
through savings. 73 This phenomenon may be in part explained in the
United States by the tax subsidy afforded employed persons with
health insurance, which makes it cheaper to cover these expenses with
before-tax dollars through insurance than with after-tax dollars out-
of-pocket.74 This, however, does not wholly explain the phenomenon.
Medicare recipients overwhelmingly insure themselves against the
68 See id. (showing that, in 1997, private and public health insurance together paid
eighty-two percent of cost of physical services and ninety-two percent of cost of hospital
care).
69 See Anne K. Gauthier et al., Risk Selection in the Health Care Market: A Work-
shop Overview, 32 Inquiry 14, 15 (1995) (noting that more than thirty-five percent of sub-
scribers submit no claims in given month, while less than five percent of subscribers
account for vast majority of claims).
70 Mark A. Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law of Ethics and Eco-
nomics of Rating Mechanisms 29 (1997).
71 The wealthy because they can afford to, the very poor because they have nothing to
lose.
72 See Hall, supra note 40, at 6-8 (explaining how insurance allows subscribers to avoid
bearing full brunt of loss, to reduce risk in aggregate, and to take advantage of economics
of scale); Wortham, supra note 40, at 843 (stating that insurance can provide such societal
benefits as stability and psychological security and can produce overall social gain).
73 See Schieber & Maeda, supra note 39, at 12 (asserting that "many individuals want to
be insured against small predictable losses").
74 Hall, supra note 40, at 25 (citing "implicit tax subsidy for employer-paid health ex-
penses" as reason that "the costs of predictable health needs are less than what employees
would have to pay from after-tax wages"); Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and
Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. Econ. Literature 629, 638 (1986) (explaining
that tax subsidy renders it "cheaper (after taxes) to pay one's medical care bills via insur-
ance than to pay them directly"). Pauly cites studies to establish that "the tax subsidy is
known to matter to the choice of group insurance," id. at 646, and alludes to the normative
proposition that this subsidy "has warped the choice process" so as to result in excessive
purchase of insurance, id. at 629.
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cost-sharing obligations imposed by Medicare, even though they re-
ceive no tax benefits from doing so. The tendency to overinsure may
have as much to do with consumer and provider culture and prefer-
ences as with tax subsidies.75 Whatever the reason, however, in most
of the developed world, most people are insured through public or
private systems that afford a high level of insurance coverage.
Individual risk aversity and preference for health insurance,
moreover, are not the only factors explaining the prevalence of health
insurance throughout the world. In most nations, the ideal of social
solidarity also plays a significant role.76 Insurance is not merely a
means through which individuals shield themselves against the risk of
incurring health care expenditures, but is also the means through
which societies afford their citizens who lack financial resources a
measure of security and basic opportunity to participate in society.77
To achieve this ideal of social solidarity, all but the least developed
nations have established some form of public health insurance.78
Two basic approaches have been devised for providing public
insurance: social insurance and tax-based insurance programs.79
The social insurance approach to health care finance originated
in Bismarck's Germany in the 1880s and continues today in the
sickness funds of Central Europe, Asia, and Latin America and in the
Medicare program in the United States.80 Social insurance programs
75 E-mail from Randall Bovbjerg, Principal Research Associate, Urban Institute, to
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Professor of Law, Ohio State University (June 13, 2000) (on file
with the New York University Law Review).
76 Schieber & Maeda, supra note 39, at 10-11 (asserting that "governments often pro-
vide access to health services for people who cannot afford them" because "almost all
societies view access to health care as a basic human right"); Deborah A. Stone, The Strug-
gle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 287, 290-92 (1993) (argu-
ing that medical care is financed through social insurance because of "solidarity principle,"
namely, "that medical care should be distributed according to medical need").
77 See Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267
JAMA 2503, 2507-08 (1992) (discussing morally fair underwriting); Stone, supra note 76, at
290-92 (discussing solidarity principle).
78 World Health Org., supra note 27, at 192-95.
79 Laurene A. Graig, Health of Nations: An International Perspective on U.S. Health
Care Reform 3-4 (3d ed. 1999); see also Richard B. Saltman & Josep Figueras, European
Health Care Reform: Analysis of Current Strategies 115-39 (1997) (discussing funding of
health services in Europe).
80 See Jirgen Marrde & Peter P. Groenewegen, Back to Bismarck: Eastern European
Health Care Systems in Transition 6, 12-13 (1997) (reporting that former Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and to some extent Poland were among first countries to introduce Bismarckian
social insurance and recently have reintroduced it); Bengt Jnsson & Philip Musgrove,
Government Financing of Health Care, in Innovations in Health Care Financing, supra
note 39, at 41, 46-51 (discussing existence of social insurance approach in various
countries).
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also are emerging in the former Communist nations of Eastern
Europe.81
Social insurance programs collect from their insureds a payroll
tax-an employee contribution-which is withheld from the insureds'
income or is paid by their employers.82 Social insurance funds spend
this money to cover the cost of health care received by these insureds
and also insure against the risks of unemployment, retirement, occu-
pational injury or disease, and disability.83 In some nations these
funds are administered by the government; in many they are adminis-
tered by quasi-public entities that are occupationally, religiously, or
politically based. 4 In a few nations, an attempt is made to establish
trust funds to cover future medical expenses of contributors.85 Most
social insurance programs, however, are funded on a pay-as-you-go
basis. Because social insurance programs are tied to earmarked,
wage-based "contributions," they do not always guarantee universal
coverage. 8
6
While social insurance programs began in the nineteenth century
as attempts to forestall the growth of socialism, tax-based national
health insurance programs are predominantly the creations of twenti-
eth-century socialist governments.87 Tax-based insurance programs
are funded through general revenue taxes.8s They are administered
by government entities.8 9 They usually cover the entire population,
regardless of occupation (though in some nations they are means-
81 Marrde & Groenewegen, supra note 80, at 12-13 (describing post-19S9 reintroduc-
tion of social insurance in Eastern Europe); Saltman & Figueras, supra note 79, at 123-27
(detailing characteristics of social insurance programs emerging in Eastern European
nations).
82 Jnsson & Musgrove, supra note 80, at 46-47 (indicating that social insurance is fi-
nanced through payroll taxes, paid by workers or employers). Both methods of Financing
are economically identical.
83 In fact, social insurance programs initially focused on wage replacement and only
later and gradually came to focus on covering the costs of medical treatment, because wage
losses were usually much greater than health care costs. Paul Starr, The Social Transforma-
tion of American Medicine 238, 245 (1982) (reporting that health insurance was aimed
originally only at compensating for wage losses occasioned by illness and that such losses
were two to four times greater than health care costs for individual workers).
84 J6nsson & Musgrove, supra note 80, at 47 (noting that social insurance programs
sometimes are administered by independent bodies).
85 This is true of the Hospital Insurance portion of the U.S. Medicare program. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395i (1992 & Supp. 2000) (establishing Federal Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund); see also 26 U.S.C §§ 1401(b), 3101(b), 3111(b) (1994) (setting tax rates for trust
fund contributions).
86 See Richard A. Knox, Germany. One Nation with Health Care for All 54-62 (1993)
(describing gaps in coverage in Germany).
87 See Starr, supra note 83, at 238-39.
88 See J6nsson & Musgrove, supra note 80, at 46.
89 Id. at 47.
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tested). The archetypal tax-based insurance program, the British Na-
tional Health Service (NHS), established by the Labour government
which came to power following World War II, purchases hospital care
from public hospitals and primary care services from private general
practitioners. 90 Tax-based insurance programs also exist in the Scan-
dinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and in one form or an-
other, in many developing nations. 91 Our own Medicaid program
bears many of the hallmarks of a tax-based insurance program de-
scribed above.
Though both social insurance and tax-based insurance programs
rely on public funding of health care services, neither approach is nec-
essarily tied to public provision of services. Some national health ser-
vice programs, such as those found in Sweden, provide health care
services predominantly through the program's own salaried profes-
sionals.92 In the British, Canadian, and Danish national health ser-
vices, on the other hand, general practitioners are independent
professionals who cooperate with the health service as independent
contractors, not employees.93 In most national health service systems,
hospitals are publicly owned. 94 Hospitals in social insurance countries
often are publicly owned, though some countries, such as the Nether-
lands, have a large proportion of private nonprofit or religious
hospitals.
95
Tax-based programs coexist with social insurance programs in
some developing countries, with wealthier workers employed in the
formal economy enrolled in social insurance programs, while other
citizens, who do not receive regular wages, obtain health care through
90 See Donald Light & Annabelle May, Britain's Health System: From Welfare State
to Managed Markets 14-15 (1993) (describing British system).
91 See Marrde & Groenewegen, supra note 80, at 8, 11-12.
92 Stefan Hhkansson & Sara Nordling, The Health System of Sweden, in Health Care
and Reform in Industrialized Countries 191, 198-99 (Marshall W. Raffel ed., 1997) [herein-
after Industrialized Countries].
93 Peter R. Hatcher, The Health System of the United Kingdom, in Industrialized
Countries, supra note 92, at 227, 242-43; Allan Krasnik & Signild Vallgirda, The Health
System of Denmark, in Industrialized Countries, supra note 92, at 29, 31-32; Peggy Leatt &
A. Paul Williams, The Health System of Canada, in Industrialized Countries, supra note
92, at 1, 8-12.
94 Hatcher, supra note 93, at 229 (noting that in United Kingdom, many hospitals are
self-governing trusts, but are still public institutions); Krasnik & Vallgirda, supra note 93,
at 33 (describing Danish hospital system); Leatt & Williams, supra note 93. at 12 (noting
that in Canada, some hospitals are owned by religious institutions).
95 J.A.M. (Hans) Maarse, The Health System of the Netherlands, in Industrialized
Countries, supra note 92, at 135, 141. In Germany, about half of the hospital beds are
publicly owned, and the remainder are in religious or private hospitals, Wolfgang Greiner
& J.-Matthias Graf v.d. Schulenburg, The Health System of Germany, in Industrialized
Countries, supra note 92, at 77, 88.
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public hospitals and clinics.96 Most countries with social insurance
programs make allowance for persons who are not participating in the
workforce by publicly subsidizing the purchase of social insurance, or
by establishing a separate system. 97 Finally, many countries have a
completely separate program for public employees and members of
the military, as does the United States. 9s
In virtually every nation on Earth, various private health care fi-
nancing arrangements coexist with public health care financing. The
earliest private health care financing schemes were those operated by
guilds, clubs, lodges, or other nonprofit fraternal organizations.99
These organizations provided their members with medical services,
often through the means of contract doctors or clinics, and usually as
an adjunct to provision of sick or disability pay, which was much more
important to their members in the early years.100 In the United States,
provider-sponsored nonprofit plans played a pivotal role in the devel-
opment of private health insurance in the middle of the last century.101
Private health care finance is still provided in many nations through
96 See Deborah J. Chollet & Maureen Lewis, Private Insurance: Principles and Prac-
tice, in Innovations in Health Care Financing, supra note 39, at 77, 106-09 (examining roles,
characteristics, and extent of private health insurance coverage and main alternatives in
various countries).
97 See, e.g., Ass'n of Dutch Health Insurers, Health and Health Care in the Nether-
lands 3 (1999) (noting that social insurance includes recipients of social security); Knox,
supra note 86, at 58-59 (explaining that Germany subsidizes purchase of insurance ).
98 In the United States, for example, the Federal Employees Health Benefits program
covers federal employees. Comm. on Employer-Based Health Servs., Inst. of Med., Em-
ployment and Health Benefits: A Connection at Risk 73 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T.
Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter IOM]. The Department of Defense and CHAMPUS cover
members of the military and their dependents. Barry Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases,
Materials and Problems 838 (3d ed. 1997).
99 IOM, supra note 98, at 51 (discussing early voluntary initiatives); Edwin J. Faulkner,
Accident-and-Health Insurance 15-16 (1940) (discussing Friendly Societies and early
health insurance in the United States); David G. Green, Working-Class Patients and the
Medical Establishment: Self-Help in Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1948, at
8-14 (1985) (discussing work clubs, provident dispensaries, medical aid companies, doctors'
clubs, public medical services, and Friendly Society schemes); Almont Lindsey, Socialized
Medicine in England and Wales: The National Health Service 1948-61, at 5-6 (1962)
(same); Gordon McLachlan, A History of the Nuffield Provincial Trust 352-53 (1992)
(same); Starr, supra note 83, at 239-40 (discussing various schemes in England and
Germany).
100 IOM, supra note 98, at 51-53; Starr, supra note 83, at 206-09. As with social insur-
ance in the early years, wage loss replacement was often a more important benefit of these
programs than was coverage of medical costs. Id. at 245, 258.
101 See Odin V. Anderson, Blue Cross Since 1929: Accountability and the Public Trust
29-44 (1975) (tracing development of Blue Cross in 1930s); IOM, supra note 98, at 66-70
(recounting development of Blue Cross and Blue Shield); Herman Miles Somers & Anne
Ramsay Somers, Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance: The Organization and Financ-
ing of Medical Care 291-95, 317-22 (1961) (same); Starr, supra note 83, at 295-310 (same).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mutual or nonprofit insurance organizations, epitomized in the United
States by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.'02
Employers and unions or other worker organizations also played
an early role in providing or paying for health care for employees. 10 3
Again, health care in the early years often was provided through con-
tract doctors or cinics.1°4 At the present time, however, virtually all
employee benefit plans (either self-insured or administered by private
insurers) pay independent providers or managed care organizations
directly for health care services or indemnify their beneficiaries for
services the beneficiaries purchase. 105 Employee benefit plans gener-
ally are provided in the United States through Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) plans and are common in many other
countries as well.
Over time, private commercial insurers, which had long provided
life and casualty insurance, became interested in health coverage as
well. Although commercial medical insurance appeared as early as
the nineteenth century, many commercial insurers regarded the costs
of medical treatment to be uninsurable until well into the twentieth
century. It was thought that the risk of ill health was too difficult to
predict and the problem of moral hazard too significant to justify
health insurance as a commercial venture. 06 Once Blue Cross and
employment-related organizations created successful insurance pro-
grams, however, commercial insurers also entered the market.' 0 7
Though for the first several decades of its existence commercial insur-
ance meant indemnity insurance, today it generally means managed
care: schemes in which the payer plays a role in managing the in-
102 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans had 67.6 million members in the United States in
1996. HIAA, Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1999-2000, at 39 (1999) (providing
breakdown of health insurers by type and year).
103 IOM, supra note 98, at 54-55 ("In the early part of [the twentieth] century, company
medical services could be one component of 'welfare capitalism,' a range of housing, edu-
cation, social assistance, and other programs intended to socialize workers, bind them to
their employer, and discourage unions."); Somers & Somers, supra note 101, at 229-31
("The majority of health and welfare plans were set up by employers without direct partici-
pation by organized labor."); Starr, supra note 83, at 200-06, 241 (discussing company
plans). A key factor in the expansion of these plans was the recognition of the nontaxabil-
ity of employer-paid premiums for these plans. See Melissa A. Thomasson, The Impor-
tance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7543, 2000), available at http:llwww.nber.orglpapers/
w7543.pdf.
104 IOM, supra note 98, at 65-66; Starr, supra note 83, at 200-06.
105 See HIAA, supra note 102, at 13-24 (discussing types of health insurance currently
available); Starr, supra note 83, at 291-95 (same).
106 Starr, supra note 83, at 294-95.
107 J.F. Follmann, Jr., Medical Care and Health Insurance: A Study in Social Progress
112-13 (1963); Starr, supra note 83, at 331-32.
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sured's care, perhaps even providing care directly itself through health
maintenance organization arrangements.1 08
Only in the United States has private health insurance in its vari-
ous forms become the dominant form of payment for health care.109
Even in the United States, it is only dominant in terms of the propor-
tion of the population covered-not in terms of the proportion of
medical expenses paid." 0 In other nations private health insurance
coexists with public insurance programs, serving one of two functions.
First, in some nations-most often those with social insurance
programs-private insurance is available as an alternative to social in-
surance, usually for those not obligated by law to purchase social in-
surance."' In Germany, for example, only persons earning less than
6450 DM ($3200) a year are subject to mandatory enrollment in the
social insurance funds.112 Persons earning more than this amount in
general can choose to be insured either through the social insurance
funds or through private health insurance funds.'13 In Chile, all per-
sons are required to pay seven percent of their wages toward the
purchase of health insurance, but all can choose either to use these
funds to obtain social insurance coverage or to purchase private
health insurance if they can afford it.114
Second, in many nations-predominantly those with tax-based in-
surance programs-private health insurance is used to supplement
public insurance schemes."15 In several countries, for example, private
insurance covers health care products and services not insured by pub-
lic insurance, such as optical or dental care in several Canadian prov-
108 Though HMO-type arrangements are classified for some purposes as prepayment
arrangements rather than insurance (i.e., they look more like a computer service plan than
like a life insurance policy), they do involve the payment of premiums, the transfer of risk,
and payment for services, and thus will be classified as insurance for our purposes.
109 William A. Glaser, Health Insurance in Practice: International Variations in Financ-
ing, Benefits, and Problems 6-7 (1991).
110 In 1997, seventy percent of the American population was covered by private health
insurance, and twenty-six percent was covered by public programs, whereas private health
insurance covered 32.6% of national health expenditures compared to 46.7% covered by
public programs in 1996. HIAA, supra note 102, at 11, 92.
111 Glaser, supra note 109, at 65-68 (1991) (noting variations between countries).
112 Andreas Besche, Das Nebeneinder von GKV und PKV im Spiegel der Gesundheit-
spolitik [The Coexistence of Social Health Insurance and Private Health Insurance in the
Light of Health Policy], Presentation at the Herbsttagung der Arbeitskreiss "'er-
tretervereinigung der deutschen Assecurance" [Fall Conference of the Working Party of
the Association of German Undervriting Representatives] (Oct. 25, 1999) (transcript on
file with the New York University Law Review).
113 See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 133-46.
115 Glaser, supra note 109, at 77-81.
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inces,116 pharmaceuticals in the United States for Medicare
beneficiaries,"17 or certain ancillary services in Australia. 18 In other
nations, such as the United Kingdom or Australia, private insurance is
purchased by persons who in fact are fully insured by social insurance
or tax-based insurance schemes to provide double coverage, in order
to assure prompter or more convenient access to health care, more
control over choice of provider, or access to better quality health
care.119 Private health insurance serves, therefore, as a safety valve
for public systems with limited budgets. Some authorities distinguish
analytically between supplemental insurance that covers cost-sharing
obligations and noncovered services and supplemental insurance that
provides double coverage. 20 As our concern is primarily with regula-
tion of access to insurance, this distinction is unnecessary, as neither
form of supplemental insurance is regulated extensively.
A general summary of approaches to health care finance, how-
ever, cannot capture the richness and variety of health care finance as
it exists in individual nations. We turn now to several country case




As just noted, one approach to the accommodation of public and
private health care finance is for the two systems to be offered as al-
ternatives. In other words, part of the population is publicly insured,
another part privately insured. This model is being promoted by gov-
ernment policy in a number of South American countries, most nota-
116 Colleen M. Flood, The Structure and Dynamics of Canada's Health Care System, in
Canadian Health Law and Policy 5, 29 (Jocelyn Downie & Timothy Caulfield eds., 1999).
117 See Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law § 9-8 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing U.S. Medigap
coverage).
118 See infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
119 Chollet & Lewis, supra note 96, at 77, 79 (discussing role of private insurance);
Glaser, supra note 109, at 78-80 (discussing private insurance in United Kingdom).
120 See JRirgen Wasem, Regulating Private Health Insurance Markets, Presentation at
the Four Country Conference on Health Care Reforms and Health Care Policies in the
United States, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, Amsterdam-Rotterdam, Neth. 79,
81-82 (Feb. 23-25, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University
Law Review).
121 For a fuller explanation of regulation of private health insurance in Chile, see
generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We Learn from Others?
The Chilean Experience, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 863 (1999), from which much of the
following material is drawn.
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bly Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Colombia.12 It has the
longest tradition in Chile, the only nation in the world (as far as I
know) whose constitution guarantees its residents a right to purchase
private health insurance. Article 19, Section 9 of the 1980 Chilean
Constitution, dealing with the "Right to Health Protection," provides:
"Each person shall have the right to choose the health system,
whether State or private, that he wishes to join."'
'1
This right is by no means merely theoretical. Currently 3.8 mil-
lion persons, about twenty-six percent of the Chilean population, and
thirty-two percent of the workforce, are privately insured by thirty-
three Chilean private health insurance companies (Instituciones de
Salud Previsional or ISAPREs).124 Most of these persons are insured
under individual policies, though some of the smaller ISAPREs are
"closed" ISAPREs that insure only a single employer or industry, and
some members of open ISAPREs are insured as part of an employee
group.125 In 1995, forty-two percent of all Chilean health expendi-
tures (totaling U.S. $2.65 billion) came from the private sector.12 6
Chile has long been a leader in Latin America, and indeed in the
world, in public health care provision. As early as the nineteenth cen-
tury, it established public health institutions to address the problem of
communicable diseases.127 In the 1920s, it established a social insur-
ance system, covering workers and their families.12 In the 1950s, it
also created a National Health Service (SNS), resembling the British
122 Chollet & Lewis, supra note 96, at 96-97, 106-09; see also Andrd Cezar Medici et al.,
Managed Care and Managed Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Innova-
tions in Health Care Financing, supra note 39, at 215-29 (examining four basic systems
found in Latin America and Caribbean: health care providers financed out-of-pocket, pri-
vate health insurance financed by prepaid contributions, social insurance systems financed
by mandated employer and employee contributions, and publicly delivered health care).
123 Ral Bertelsen Repetto, Chile, in The Right to Health in the Americas: A Compara-
tive Constitutional Study 166, 172 (Hemn L Fuenzalida-Puelma & Susan Scholle Connor
eds., 1989).
124 Valenzuela Magafia, supra note 54, at 6, 9.
125 See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
126 SISP, Chilean Health Statistics (1997) (unpublished manuscript data supplied by
SISP to author, on file with the New York Universi. Law Review).
127 Jorge Jimenez de la Jara & Thomas J. Bossert, Chile's Health Sector Reform: Les-
sons from Four Reform Periods, in Health Sector Reform in Developing Countries: Mak-
ing Health Development Sustainable 199, 202 (Peter Berman ed., 1995) (describing
nineteenth-century health insurance institutions that focused on preventing spread of
smallpox and cholera).
M Id. The Servicio Mddico Nacional de Empleados [National Medical Service of Em-
ployees] (SERMENA) was organized under a 1968 statute as a separate legal entity to
provide social insurance for white-collar employees. Mercedes Cifuentes, Health Care, in
Private Solutions to Public Problems 53, 62 (Cristin Larroulet ed., 1993) (describing
SERMENA's Free Choice system under which beneficiaries may choose from medical pro-
fessionals registered with SERMENA).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
NHS, which used social security payroll taxes and general tax reve-
nues to finance a system of public hospitals and clinics, as well as to
provide basic public health services. 129
The Pinochet military government of the 1970s, heavily influ-
enced by the free-market ideology of the University of Chicago, im-
plemented a free-market model for the financing of health care. 130
This system did not replace the public system, however, as the
Pinochet government's dedication to libertarian ideals was accompa-
nied by a commitment to improving health care for the very poor and
to improving preventive and primary care generally. 131 Rather, the
Pinochet government combined the social insurance and national
health service systems, at the same time separating the public pur-
chaser and provider functions within the public system.132 More im-
portantly for our purposes, the Pinochet government also created a
separate private insurance system, administered through the
ISAPREs.
Under the current Chilean system, all employees, self-employed
persons who contribute to the social security pension system, and indi-
gents are covered by the public system, the National Health Fund
(FONASA), unless they elect to purchase private insurance cover-
age.133 All FONASA beneficiaries can choose either to receive ser-
vices in public facilities (for which they must pay copayments ranging
from zero to fifty percent according to income) or to purchase vouch-
ers that allow them to receive services through FONASA's network of
private preferred providers. 34 FONASA is financed by payroll taxes
129 Jimenez & Bossert, supra note 127, at 203; see also Cifuentes, supra note 128, at 62
(describing birth of public health care system through Servicio Nacional de Salud [National
Health Service] (SNS) and preponderance of State's role for financing and administering
health care). The SNS was established by statute in 1952. Id.
130 Jimenez & Bossert, supra note 127, at 207-08 (describing how team of market-ori-
ented technocrats adopted market-based economic policy and addressed social policy by
reinforcing basic safety net for poorest population).
131 Id. at 208. Included within the Pinochet policy was a commitment to prioritizing care
of mothers, children, and high-risk groups. Cifuentes, supra note 128, at 66.
132 Brian Cartin, Chile: The Effectiveness of the Reform, in Do Options Exist? The
Reform of Pension and Health Care Systems in Latin America 205,207-08 (Marfa Amparo
Cruz-Saco & Carmelo Mesa-Lago eds., 1998); World Bank, Chile: The Adult Health Pol-
icy Challenge 3-4 (1995). The Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud [National System of
Health Services] was created by statute in 1979. Cifuentes, supra note 128, at 69.
133 Valenzuela Magafia, supra note 54, at 1-2.
134 World Bank, supra note 132, at 5. The right to obtain health care from private pre-
ferred providers, previously available only to white-collar workers under SERMENA, was
extended to all beneficiaries of the Fondo Nacional de Salud [National Health Fund]
(FONASA) by statute in 1979. Cifuentes, supra note 128, at 69. The statutory provision
for subsidies and classification of copayments was established in 1985. Id. at 71. Private
establishments participating in the preferred provider arrangement are classified into three
levels based on cost, but reimbursement amounts are established based on the lowest cost
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(currently set at seven percent of income), general revenue funds, fees
for the sale of vouchers, and fees from the sale of health care ser-
vices. 135 Though the public sector remains subject to criticisms for
waste and inefficiency, 6 and suffers from shortages and waiting
lists, 137 its beneficiaries are relatively satisfied with the services they
receive.' 38
Alternatively, Chileans may choose to obtain health care cover-
age from the ISAPREs, which are private health insurance companies.
Most are owned by small groups of investors, though two are public
corporations and one is a cooperative.13 9 Twenty-one of the currently
operational ISAPREs are open to any applicants, while fourteen
smaller ISAPREs are closed.140 The vast majority of ISAPRE mem-
bers, 3.7 of 3.9 million, are members of open ISAPREs. 14' The mar-
ket is highly concentrated, with three ISAPREs containing over sixty
percent of the open ISAPRE beneficiaries, and four more containing
an additional twenty-four percent. 142 Most ISAPREs function as
level. Id. at 71-72. Beneficiaries desiring higher cost, and possibly higher quality services,
pay the difference out of pocket. Id.
135 Payroll taxes and general revenue taxes each account for about forty percent of
FONASA income. World Bank, supra note 132, at 5.
136 Some 1800 of the 4400 new personnel positions created in the health sector in the
early 1990s went to administrative personnel, who now consume thirty-five percent of the
health sector's total expenditures. Cartin, supra note 132, at 218.
137 Claudia Villalobos, El Enfermo Cr6nico [The Chronically Il], La Epoca, May 17,
1998, at 1.
138 In a 1995 beneficiary satisfaction survey, sixty-eight percent of affiliates of the Insti-
tuciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPREs) preferred their own system, while twenty-three
percent were inclined to FONASA; sixty-six percent of FONASA beneficiaries favored
their own system, while twenty-nine percent valued the ISAPRE system more. Ricardo
Bitrin & Francisco Xavier Almarza, Las Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPREs) en
Chile [The Health Insurance Institutions (ISAPREs) in Chile] 56 (1996).
139 Interview with Francisco Quesney Langlois, Medical Director, Banmedica, in Santi-
ago, Chile (June 24, 1998) (interview notes on file with the New York University Law Re-
view). Two ISAPREs, Aetna and Cigna, are subsidiaries of U.S. insurance companies.
Karen Stocker et al., The Exportation of Managed Care to Latin America, 340 New Eng. J.
Med. 1131, 1133 (1999). The largest ISAPRE, Consalud, was originated by the Construc-
tion Industry Council as part of its welfare efforts to serve construction workers, and is
nonprofit. Interview with Nicolds Estarck Aguilera, Director of Systems and Technologies,
Consalud, in Santiago, Chile (June 16, 1998). It is different from the more entrepreneurial
ISAPREs in important respects, which will be explored below.
140 Cartin, supra note 132, at 210 (explaining that open-type ISAPRE "accepts any in-
sured able to pay the costs (premium) associated with membership, whereas the closed
type is tied to one or more companies or industries and provides services only to their
employees").
141 SISP, Boletfn Estadistico [Statistical Bulletin] 35 tbl.2.1.9 (1997) (giving ISAPRE
members by insurer for 1997).
142 Id.
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traditional indemnity insurers.143 A few of the ISAPREs, however,
for some time have provided as well as paid for health care, while
other ISAPREs have long had their own preferred provider
arrangements. 144
Any employee, pensioner, or other person who can find an
ISAPRE willing to sell him or her a policy may purchase an ISAPRE
policy, paid for with the seven percent health insurance payroll tax
supplemented by an out-of-pocket payment for any additional pre-
mium that may be necessary. 145 ISAPREs are marketed aggressively
by in-house sales agents, who are paid on a commission basis.146 A
person who purchases insurance from an ISAPRE is no longer cov-
ered by FONASA-he or she moves from the public to the private
sector of health care finance.
The way in which ISAPRE insurance is purchased contributes to
a bizarre multiplicity of health care plans. A health plan is a particu-
lar policy covering a particular configuration of services, coinsurance,
and caps, marketed by a particular ISAPRE. Though it is difficult to
143 In fact, patients seeking care usually first secure a voucher from their insurer by
paying the copayment and then take the voucher to the provider, who bills the insurer for
the service based on the voucher. The system thus functions quite differently from tradi-
tional indemnity insurance in the United States, under which the patient paid the provider
first, then sought indemnity from the insurer. See Interview with Francisco Quesney
Langlois, supra note 139.
144 See Jost, supra note 121, at 875-77. But Chile has a strong ideology and tradition of
free choice of provider, and ISAPREs have been reluctant to place very strict limits on
choice. Interview with Eduardo Urrutia Hewstone, General Manager, and Lee
Kortmansky, Chief of Program Administration, Clinica Davila, in Santiago, Chile (June 24,
1998).
145 Law 18,933, arts. 29-30 (Chile 1990). A person who chooses to be insured by an
ISAPRE must pay seven percent of his employment income as the insurance premium up
to a ceiling of 4.2 UF a month (equivalent to U.S. $113 in November 2000). Valenzuela
Magafia, supra note 54, at 4. (The UF is a unit of measure adjusted automatically for
inflation on a monthly basis. It is widely used in Chile for financial transactions and thus is
commonly understood.) Though U.S. $113 is a modest sum, considering the cost of health
insurance, it is a significant amount given that the average income of a member of an open
ISAPRE was U.S. $696 monthly in 1997. Id. at 24 tbl.6. Persons insured by ISAPREs may
supplement the seven percent, and often pay an additional two to three percent voluntarily
if the seven percent does not cover all desired benefits. An employer may also supplement
the seven percent with an additional amount of up to two percent for poorer workers and
claim a tax credit for the contribution, resulting in a modest, though symbolically impor-
tant, public subsidy for the ISAPRE system. The two percent subsidy when added to the
seven percent premium may not exceed 1 UF (about U.S. $27.10 in November of 2000) for
the insured plus 0.5 UF (U.S. $13.50) for each dependent, so only persons of very modest
income are eligible for the subsidy. This subsidy makes up about 2.6% of ISAPRE reve-
nues. SISP, supra note 126.
146 The commission structure usually takes into account the value of the policy, the
length of time the insured remains with the ISAPREs, and the track record of the insured
for paying premiums. Sales agents therefore face an incentive to sign up stable applicants
with relatively high incomes. Interview with Francisco Quesney Langlois, supra note 139.
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ascertain the number of health plans that exist within the ISAPRE
system, it is unquestionably enormous. Persons within the Superin-
tendency estimate that 10,000 plans exist, with 1000 or so available at
any one time, but individuals affiliated with particular ISAPREs esti-
mate that some individual ISAPREs independently may have
thousands of plans.' 47
This great number of plans exists primarily for two reasons. First,
it allows exquisite price discrimination. The statutory seven percent
premium is a continuous variable, since the level of wages varies con-
tinuously. Each ISAPRE thus must offer a large number of plans so
that at any premium, corresponding to seven percent of any given
wage level, a variety of choices are available. 148 Second, the multiplic-
ity of plans facilitates a peculiar form of indirect experience rating that
represents the ISAPREs' response to the legal prohibition against di-
rect experience rating. The law requires that ISAPREs raise premi-
ums across the board for an entire plan if they want to raise rates at all
and prohibits raising premiums for individuals who require expensive
medical care. It is widely believed that ISAPREs do in fact raise pre-
miums, sometimes dramatically, for plans with which they have a neg-
ative experience, but then create new plans that closely resemble the
old plan and offer them to persons who had had a favorable claims
experience under the old plan. Thus high-cost insureds pay more or
drop the plan, while less costly insureds move to new, lower-cost
plans, permitting indirect experience rating but also adding to the
multiplicity of plans.
ISAPRE advocates assert that the multiplicity of plans signifies
healthy competition and promotes consumer choice. Skeptics, how-
ever, believe that the multiplicity of plans makes true comparison
among insurers difficult, if not impossible.149 This is particularly true
because coverage limitations are often expressed in terms of internal
insurance company schedules that are difficult to locate and under-
stand.150 The fact that health insurance is sold only by agents of par-
ticular companies, rather than by independent agents marketing a
variety of policies, makes comparison even more difficult.
147 Interview with Gonzalo Sim6n, Development Director, Vida Tres, in Santiago, Chile
(June 19, 1998) (interview notes on file with the New York University Law Review).
148 One expert estimated that if the premium were allowed to vary from 6.5% to 7.5%,
eighty percent of the plans would disappear. Interview with Francisco Quesney Langlois,
supra note 139.
149 Mathias Kifinaun, Chile: Private Health Insurance in Chile: Basic or Complemen-
tary Insurance for Outpatient Services?, 51 Int'l Soc. Sec. Rev. 137, 143 (1993).
150 Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, Chief, Audit Department, SISP, in Santiago,
Chile (June 22, 1998) (interview notes on file with the New York University Law Review).
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ISAPREs have relatively high operating costs, which are smaller
for larger ISAPREs and have diminished over time. Between 1985
and 1995, the percentage of ISAPRE revenues actually returned to
beneficiaries in the form of medical reimbursements and sick leave
increased from 59.5 percent to 71.5 percent. 51 In 1997, 18.9 percent
of ISAPREs' revenues were spent on sales and administrative
expenses.' 52
Though most ISAPRE policies are purchased by individuals,
thirty-five to forty percent are negotiated as collective policies cover-
ing a firm's employees as a group.' 53 Collective policies tend to offer
more favorable coverage for employees for several reasons: The pro-
portion of the premium devoted to sales and underwriting costs is
lower, higher income employees subsidize lower income employees
(though there are often several benefit levels within collective plans
for different levels of employees), and collective policy negotiators
tend to drive a harder bargain.' 54 Some ISAPREs are unenthusiastic
about collective policies, however, because the freedom of movement
guaranteed to beneficiaries allows higher income employees to opt
out of collective plans, undermining the underwriting assumptions on
which the plans were based.155
ISAPRE policies are commonly subject to significant coinsurance
obligations, though ISAPREs do offer full coverage policies to those
willing to pay the price. A study of seventy-five percent of open
ISAPRE members showed the majority had an average copayment of
thirty percent, though a small percentage of those insureds with high
costs of care pay almost fifty percent.1 56 More importantly, coverage
is almost always subject to caps, both globally and service-by-ser-
vice.157 Historically these caps have not been expressed in readily un-
derstandable terms such as cash equivalent, but rather by reference to
a separate company list of general coverage specifications, which is
not readily available.
ISAPREs not only cover medical care; they also pay for sick
leave, which in fact accounts for twenty to twenty-two percent of the
151 Bitrdn & Almarza, supra note 138, at 43.
152 SISP, supra note 126.
153 Bitrdn & Almarza, supra note 139, at 34.
154 Interview with Marfa Eugenia Salazar C., Health Director, Probenefits, in Santiago,
Chile (June 16, 1998) (interview notes on file with author).
155 Interview with Francisco Quesney Langlois, supra note 139.
156 Bitrin & Almarza, supra note 138, at 31-32. By law, copayments cannot exceed sev-
enty-five percent. Id.
157 Kifmann, supra note 149, at 144.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 76:419
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INSURANCE
ISAPREs' claims-related expenses. 158 ISAPREs must pay sick leave
if a doctor certifies an insured to be unable to work. 159 Until 1990 the
ISAPREs also were responsible for maternity leave, to which a preg-
nant woman is entitled from forty-two days before the birth until
eighty-four days after.160 Even apart from pregnancy leaves, however,
working women request sick leave twice as often as do men, contrib-
uting to the preference of ISAPREs for insuring men rather than
women.1
61
ISAPREs in fact have no obligation to accept particular appli-
cants for insurance, and can refuse to insure persons who are likely to
incur high medical expenses. They also may vary premiums freely
based on age, sex, and plan coverage for those applicants whom they
insure.162
ISAPRE coverage is skewed, not surprisingly, towards the
wealthier members of society. The average monthly wage of ISAPRE
members in 1997 was about U.S. $700, while the average wage of
FONASA beneficiaries (excluding indigents) was U.S. $250.163 Over
thirty-three percent of ISAPRE members earn more than U.S. $830 a
month, and over sixty-three percent more than U.S. $400.16 This is
not surprising, as the Chilean system in particular was designed to re-
serve the publicly subsidized public health system for the less fortu-
nate. Indeed, the remarkable thing about the ISAPRE system is that
it extends so far down into the population and covers people of such
modest means. Over one-third of ISAPRE members earn less than
U.S. $400 a month, which means that their seven percent premiums
equal less than U.S. $28 a month, unless they are supplemented by the
employer or employee.
165
Coverage also is skewed toward young, healthy males. ISAPRE
coverage drops dramatically upon retirement. Only 9.8% of ISAPRE
158 Valenzuela Magafia, supra note 54, at 17. For 1996 the figure was nineteen percent.
Nat'1 Ass'n of Pre-Paid Health Ins. Plans, ISAPREs: The Private Health Sector in Chile 23
(1996).
159 Law 18,933, art. 37 (Chile 1990). The insurance companies have medical controllers
who attempt to identify and deny unnecessary or excessive sick leaves. About three per-
cent of the leaves are rejected. Bitrdn & Almarza, supra note 138, at 40. Beneficiaries
whose applications are denied or modified may appeal to a supervisory body, the Comisi6n
de Medicina Preventiva e Invalidez [Preventive Medicine and Disability Commission],
where they usually win. Interview with Francisco Quesney Langlois, supra note 139.
160 Valenzuela Magafia, supra note 54, at 17 n.10.
161 Id. at 17.
162 Law 18,933, art. 33.
163 SISP, supra note 126; see also supra note 145.
164 SISP, supra note 126.
165 Id.
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members are fifty-five or over, and only 2.7% are sixty-five or over. 166
Some ISAPREs will not accept applicants who are over a certain age,
and all charge higher premiums to the elderly. 167 As noted above,
women of childbearing age also have a difficult time securing
ISAPRE coverage in their own right-sixty-nine percent of ISAPRE
primary insured individuals are men.168 Women are much more likely
to be insured as dependents of insureds, because dependents cannot
receive sick leave, but in the prime childbearing years (between
twenty and thirty-five) only about thirty-one percent of total ISAPRE
beneficiaries, including primary insureds and dependents, are
women.169 Once women reach the age of thirty-five, they are as likely
to be insured by ISAPREs as are men. 70
Though ISAPREs have considerable control over whom they ac-
cept as insureds, they nevertheless are subject to regulation. Once a
person has been insured by an ISAPRE for one year, the ISAPRE
cannot terminate the insured unless he or she has breached the terms
of the insurance policy, though the insured can leave an ISAPRE at
any time with at least one month's notice.' 71 Further, as has been
noted already, an ISAPRE may not raise the rates that it charges any
single insured member. If an ISAPRE wishes to increase premiums, it
cannot raise one member's rates above rates given new members at
that time and must give two months' notice of the increase.172
ISAPREs are required to pay something for each of the services
covered by FONASA, and under recent regulations also must cover
these services at least to the extent that they would be covered under
FONASA.173 ISAPREs may exclude only a short list of services or
conditions, such as cosmetic surgery for the purposes of beautification
(not of repair of malformation), nursing care at home or in institu-
tions, or services required because of war or criminal conduct.174 Re-
166 SISP, supra note 141, at 33 tbl.2.1.7. Since only 7.2% of the Chilean population is
over sixty-five years of age, see World Bank, Report No. 19940, Chile Health Insurance
Issues: Old Age and Catastrophic Health Costs 27 (2000), http://wvw.worldbank.org,
these figures are not quite as skewed as they appear.
167 Bitrin & Almarza, supra note 138, at 70-72 (stating that elderly are charged 2 to 4.5
times rate of young person).
168 SISP, supra note 141, tbls.2.1.7, 2.1.8.
169 Id.
170 Superintendencia de ISAPREs [Superintendency of ISAPREs], Series Estadfsticas
Anuales: Sistema ISAPRE 1981-1998 [Annual Statistical Series: ISAPRE System 1981-
1998] 56 tbls.2.7.5, 2.7.6 (1998).
171 Law 18,933, art. 38 (Chile 1990); SISP, Resoluci6n Exenta No. 2500 § 5.3 (1997)
(modifying SISP, Circular No. 36 (1997)), http://www.sisp.cl/intecset.htm).
172 Law 18,933, art. 38.
173 SISP, Circular No. 36, §1.3, http://www.sisp.cl/intecset.htm.
174 Law 18,933, art. 33-bis.; SISP, Resoluci6n Exenta No. 2263 § 5.1 (1997), http:II
www.sisp.cl/intecset.htm.
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cent legislation makes ISAPREs responsible, at least initially, for
expenses attendant to emergency treatment of their members.
ISAPREs may impose waiting periods only for pregnancy and preex-
isting conditions.175 Under recently issued regulations, preexisting
conditions must be covered fully after eighteen months.
176
ISAPREs also are subsidized by the government in several differ-
ent ways. To begin, the ubiquity of caps for most services and of over-
all caps makes ISAPRE insurance coverage of limited value for
catastrophic conditions, though ISAPREs also do make catastrophic
policies available for a price.177 ISAPRE members who experience
health care catastrophes, therefore, often must return to the public
system for care. Indeed, FONASA does not know precisely whom it
covers, and it is widely believed that ISAPRE members routinely re-
ceive services in SNS hospitals at FONASA expense once their
ISAPRE caps are exceeded, even though this technically is not per-
mitted except in emergencies.178 Indeed, one analyst has argued per-
suasively that private insurance in Chile operates much like private
175 Law 18,933, art. 33(f); SISP, Resoluci6n Exenta No. 2263 § 5.2.1. Treatment related
to a nonreported preexisting condition must be covered unless the last medical treatment
for the condition took place within the preceding five years and the insured knowingly
concealed the existence of the condition. Law 18,933, art. 33-bis. Costs associated vith
pregnancy only need be covered proportionately to the amount of time remaining in the
pregnancy at the time of admission to the ISAPRE; for example, a woman becoming in-
sured with three months remaining in her pregnancy would be covered for one-third of her
maternity costs. Id. arts. 33(f), 33-bis.
176 SISP, Resoluci6n Exenta No. 2263 § 5.2.1. The regulation only applies to disclosed
preexisting illnesses. Concealed preexisting conditions need not be covered until five years
have elapsed. Id. § 5.2.3.
177 Bitrgn & Almarza, supra note 138, at 65 (noting limitations on ISAPRE catastrophic
conditions coverage). Catastrophic policies are issued by life as well as health insurance
companies. Catastrophic policies often exclude certain diseases or coverage of the elderly.
Id.; see also Ui Wainer K., Hacia una mayor equidad en la salud: El caso de las ISAPREs
[Towards Greater Health Equality: The Case of the ISAPREs] 29-32 (1997) (citing studies
finding that small but significant number of ISAPRE beneficiaries encounter uncovered
medical expenses that are catastrophic relative to their income, which is particularly likely
to occur with persons who have low-coverage plans and seek care from high-cost
hospitals).
178 Bitr~n & Almarza, supra note 138, at 67 (explaining incentives and interaction be-
tween ISAPRE and FONASA); Osvaldo Larrafiaga, Eficiencia y equidad en el sistema de
salud chileano [Efficiency and Equity in the Chilean Health System] 27 (n.d.) (noting that
public system's lack of control mechanisms promotes this situation); Interview with Gior-
gio Solimano, President, CORSAPS, in Santiago, Chile (June 19,1998) (interview notes on
file with the New York University Law Review). FONASA is trying to establish a compre-
hensive list of its beneficiaries, but currently can identify only ninety to ninety-five percent
of them. FONASA, however, is supposed to get lists from the ISAPREs of their benefi-
ciaries, and public hospitals are in the process of developing systems of certification that
would require them to verify insurance status at time of admission. Where hospitals dis-
cover that a patient is a member of an ISAPRE, they are supposed to bill the ISAPRE and
the patient for their respective obligations for the cost of the care. Interview with Rony
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insurance in other countries that have national health services-as a
supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the public coverage.
179
Second, the state bears the cost of maternity leave, immunization,
and other public health programs for ISAPRE as well as FONASA
beneficiaries. 80 Finally, ISAPRE premiums and disbursements are
exempt from taxation and, additionally, up to two percent of em-
ployer contributions to ISAPREs above the seven percent premium
can be exempt from taxation for low income insureds, a benefit not
available to FONASA members. 81
In fairness, it must be noted that the ISAPREs also subsidize the
public sector, though the subsidies are less obvious. First, many pro-
fessionals who work in the public sector also provide care on a fee-for-
service basis to ISAPRE beneficiaries. Many of these professionals
make the bulk of their income in the private sector, and deliver care
for much lower compensation in the public sector. In fact, the
ISAPREs have made a significant contribution to the development of
a private health infrastructure in Chile, by freeing up public health
facilities to treat public beneficiaries.18 2 Second, some believe that the
reported higher rates of physician visits by ISAPRE members com-
pared to publicly insured patients may be due in part to fraudulent
receipt of ISAPRE benefits by persons who are in fact publicly in-
sured.18 3 Controls over the receipt of ISAPRE-financed services ap-
pear not to be very effective. The fact that cross-subsidies flow in
both directions, however, further demonstrates the gulf that separates
the ISAPRE system from the free market ideal.
In sum, though the Chilean market for private insurance comes
quite close to approximating the free market ideal at the point of ini-
tial purchase, private health insurance is regulated more closely at the
point of renewal, and an extensive system of public subsidies distorts
the insurance market.
B. Germany
Though Germany has the world's oldest modem social insurance
system, dating back to the 1880s, its tradition of private health insur-
Lenz Alcayaga, Director of FONASA, in Santiago, Chile (June 24, 1998) (interview notes
on file with author).
179 Kifmann, supra note 149.
180 Larraflaga, supra note 178, at 26.
181 Id.
182 The percentage of total hospital beds in private hospitals grew from ten percent in
1981 to twenty-five percent in 1996. Valenzuela Magafia, supra note 54, at 32 tbl.18.
183 See Interview with Marcel Maira Carlini, Vice President, and Eduardo Hoyos Lom-
bardi, Director of Health, Consalud, in Santiago, Chile (June 16, 1998) (interview notes on
file with author).
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ance dates back much further, to the medieval guilds and, later,
friendly societies. 184 A founding principle of Germany's social insur-
ance scheme was that it would cover only those who required social
protection-originally manual laborers-and that the rest of the pop-
ulation would be covered by private insurance.185 During the century
following the founding of the social insurance system, however, the
proportion of the population socially insured expanded steadily, as
more and more vocational and demographic groups were assimilated
into the social insurance scheme.186 The boundary between the pri-
vate system (the Privat Krankenversicherung (PKV)) and the social
health insurance system (the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
(GKV)) has been relatively stable since the 1970s, when the last major
occupational group-agricultural workers-was brought within the
social insurance system.187
Today, about 7.2 million Germans are covered by comprehensive
private PKV insurance, compared to about 50.9 million who belong to
the public GKV system.188 Three major groups are covered by the
PKV: the self-employed, civil servants, and employees whose income
exceeds a certain level, set for the year 2000 at 6450 DM per month in
the West (about $3200), and 5325 DM in the East.189 Employees
whose income exceeds the compulsory insurance level can opt for pri-
vate insurance, but if they do so they are largely precluded from re-
turning thereafter to the GKV. 90 Approximately 6.2 million persons
who could be insured privately because of their income voluntarily
choose public insurance instead.191 Because PKV premiums are un-
derwritten based on risk status, while GKV rates are based strictly on
184 Peter Bach et al., Private Krankenversicherung: MB/KK- und MBIKT-Kommentar
[Private Health Insurance: Commentary on the MB/KK and the MB/KTJ 67 (2d ed. 1993).
The MB/KK are the regulations governing private health insurance in Germany.
185 CEA, supra note 56, at 29.
186 Bach et al., supra note 184, at 67-75.
187 Id. at 71.
188 Verband der privaten Krankenversicherung [Private Insurance Association], Private
Health Insurance: Facts and Figures 1998199, at 9, 11 (1999) [hereinafter Facts and
Figures]. Another 7.6 million persons who are insured publicly also purchase private sup-
plemental insurance to cover services not covered by public insurance, such as better hos-
pital accommodation, supplemental dental care, foreign travel health coverage, or
supplemental loss of income insurance. Id. at 16-20.
189 Besche, supra note 112, at 19; Private Health Insurance, in Gesellschaft fdr Ver-
sicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung [Society for the Study and Design of Insurance] &
King's Fund, British-German Workshop on Health Policy 86,93 (1999) (comments of An-
dreas Besche).
190 Besche, supra note 112, at 16-18. Employees pay half the premium for private insur-
ance if the employer would have been responsible for paying under the statutory insurance
system. Graig, supra note 79, at 55.
191 Facts and Figures, supra note 188, at 9.
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a percentage of income that does not vary with age, sex, or even num-
ber of dependents, those who are less healthy or have large families
often find the GKV to be the better deal.192
Privately insured individuals in Germany can choose the benefit
package best suited to their needs from a wide variety of benefit com-
binations. 193 Insureds also may opt between policies that provide full
indemnification and those imposing high cost-sharing obligations.
PKV premiums are written on a level lifetime basis; that is, premiums
are set for life at the time of application, taking into account the age,
gender, and health status of the applicant, with the goal of accumulat-
ing sufficient reserves while the insured is young to cover anticipated
greater health care expenses in old age.' 94 Though premiums are in
theory not supposed to be increased in later life, they are in fact ad-
justed from time to time to account for health care inflation. 195 Re-
turns on accumulated lifetime reserves exceeding a certain level,
however, are applied to reducing premium costs in later life.196 Siza-
ble premium rebates also are offered to those who do not submit
claims over a period of time.' 97
While on the surface the market for private insurance in Ger-
many resembles the competitive ideal, the PKV in fact is regulated
heavily. The general policy conditions of health insurance policies
must be approved by the state before use.198 Waiting periods may last
only three months before coverage begins, or eight months for certain
kinds of care such as maternity care, psychotherapy, or orthodontics,
and newborns of insureds must be covered immediately, as must per-
sons who transfer from the social insurance funds.' 99 Insureds must
192 See Private Health Insurance, supra note 189, at 94-95 (comments of Andreas
Besche) (providing calculations for private health insurance (PKV) and public health in-
surance (GKV) premiums).
193 CEA, supra note 56, at 30.
194 See § 8a MB/KK (F.R.G.), reprinted in Peter Bach et al., Private Krankenver-
sicherung: MB/KK- und MB/KT-Kommentar [Private Health Insurance: Commentary on
the MB/KK and the MB/KT] 289 (2d ed. 1993).
195 Elliot K. Wicks, German Health Care: Financing, Administration, and Coverage 30
(1992) (explaining intentions behind basic rate design of PKV).
196 § 12a VAG (F.R.G.). The VAG (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz or Insurance Over-
sight Code) is the statute governing insurance in general in Germany and is available in
English translation at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutesfVAG.htm. These rebates
amounted to nearly DM 777 million in 1998. Facts and Figures, supra note 188, at 41.
197 These rebates amounted to DM 764 million in 1998. Facts and Figures, supra note
188, at 40.
198 CEA, supra note 56, at 29.
199 §§ 2(2), 3 MB/KK, reprinted in Peter Bach et al., Private Krankenversicherung: MB/
KK- und MB/KT-Kommentar 122-23, 176-77 (2d ed. 1993).
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be guaranteed free choice of doctor and hospital. 20 The Law on
Compulsory Long-Term Care Insurance of 1995 requires all privately
insured individuals to carry long-term-care insurance, the premiums,
terms, and conditions of which are highly regulated.2 01
Private insurance plans operate on an indemnity basis for profes-
sional services. Health care professionals are limited by law with re-
spect to how much they can charge, but charges to privately insured
individuals are much higher than the payments professionals receive
from the public insurance program. 202 Private insurers do not negoti-
ate directly with professionals for lower charges.
Private insurance funds forego strict risk-based underwriting
principles with respect to certain insureds. Civil servants, who ac-
count for about half of privately insureds, are accepted regardless of
medical risk, though surcharges of up to 100% are charged to high-
risk applicants, and private insurers share among themselves the dis-
proportionate risks encountered because of such insureds.20 3 Insurers
do not cancel insureds once accepted, and charge a fixed rate for
children.2 4
Increasingly, the government has begun to obligate the PKV to
take on lower-income insureds, thus relieving the GKV of the finan-
cial burden of insuring these persons. These lower-income insureds
are then cross-subsidized by private insureds. The recently adopted
Health Reform 2000 statute, for example, prohibits those who are
over fifty-five from returning from the PKV to the GKV when their
income drops205 The statute also expands the coverage of the "Stan-
dard Tariff," a special low-cost private insurance premium pegged to
public insurance premium levels, to cover lower-income insureds over
the age of fifty-five. 20 6 The standard tariff also is extended to civil
servants in certain circumstances without risk adjustment.20 7 The 2000
200 § 4 MBIKK, reprinted in Peter Bach et al., Private Krankenversicherung: MBIKK-
und MB/KT-Kommentar 180-81 (2d ed. 1993).
201 CEA, supra note 56, at 30-31.
202 Wicks, supra note 195, at 31.
203 Id. at 28.
204 Id. at 30.
205 Besche, supra note 112, at 17.
206 Id. The Standard Tariff was introduced in 1994 to cover persons over the age of
sixty-five with limited means. § 257 SGB (F.R.G.). Chapter V of the SGB
(Socialgesetzbuch or Social Insurance Code) governs the German social health insurance
program.
20 Press Release, Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung [Private Insurance Asso-
ciation], Auswirkungen der GKV-Gesundheitsreform 2000 und der Anderung des
Pflegeversicherungsgesetzes auf die Privatversicherten [Implications of the Social Insur-
ance Health Reform of 2000 and the Change in the Nursing Care Insurance Law for the
Privately Insured] (Dec. 20, 1999), at http:/www.pkv.delpresse/P91220.htm.
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Reform law further imposes a ten percent surcharge on younger in-
sureds to alleviate the premium costs experienced by older in-
sureds.20 8 In sum, though an active market for private insurance exists
in Germany, private insurance premiums and contract provisions are
set increasingly not by the market, but rather by public regulation, at
least for some private insureds.
C. Australia
Australia also has a comparatively high level of health insurance
coverage. About 30.5% of the Australian population is covered by
private health insurance,20 9 and about eleven percent of health care
expenditures are provided by private health insurance. 210 Most pri-
vate insurance companies are nonprofit, and most insurance is sold on
an individual basis, though group policies do exist.211
Public health insurance is quite recent in Australia: The current
Medicare program dates only from 1983.212 From the 1950s until the
1970s, the government subsidized the purchase of private health insur-
ance.213 A public health insurance program (Medibank) was created
in 1975 by a Labour government, but when the Liberal-National (con-
servative) government regained power later that year, it turned away
from public finance, offering subsidies for those who would opt out of
the public program for private insurance and imposing tax penalties
on those who chose not to.214 To assure universal availability of pri-
vate insurance, the conservative coalition government also created a
government-sponsored private insurance company-Medibank Pri-
vate-which continues to be the largest private insurer in Australia. 15
The return of a Labour government in 1983 led to the reinstatement
208 Besche, supra note 112, at 18.
209 PHIAC, supra note 53, at 1.
210 Commonwealth Dep't of Health and Aged Care, Private Health Insurance 5 (Occa-
sional Papers: New Series No. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Private Health Insurance (Austl.).
211 See Indus. Comm'n, Private Health Insurance 53 (Report No. 57, 1997), http://
www.pc.gov.au/ic/inquiry/57privatehealth/finalreport/.
212 George R. Palmer & Stephanie D. Short, Health Care and Public Policy: An Austra-
lian Analysis 58 (1994) (discussing historical background of health insurance in Australia).
213 This government scheme is known as the "Earle Page scheme." Id. at 55. Under this
scheme, pensioners received fully subsidized hospital and medical care, while others re-
ceived subsidies for purchasing private insurance. Richard de Abreu Lourenco et al., The
Australian Health Care System 10-11 (Ctr. for Health Econ. Research & Evaluation, Dis-
cussion Paper 38, 1999) (discussing historical background of health insurance in Australia).
214 Palmer & Short, supra note 212, at 56-58 (recounting establishment of Medibank and
subsequent return to voluntary insurance).
215 Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 103-06 (discussing Medibank Private and noting
that it is largest private health fund in Australia).
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of a public insurance program, renamed Medicare, which now seems
to enjoy almost universal political acceptance.
Medicare covers hospital care (delivered through public hospitals
provided through the states and funded by Commonwealth and state
funds), physician care (paid for by the Commonwealth program on an
assignment or indemnification basis), and pharmaceutical benefits.
216
Medicare is financed by a 1.4% levy on taxable income and by general
revenue funds.2
17
Though the proportion of the population covered by private in-
surance has dropped steadily since the introduction of Medicare, pri-
vate health insurance remains very important in Australia.218
Although everyone in Australia is covered by Medicare, and, there-
fore, private insurance is in a sense supplemental insurance offering
"double cover,1219 private insurance in Australia also can be consid-
ered as an alternative to social insurance, both because it offers access
to a health care system separate from that covered by the public sys-
tem, and because government incentives and penalties directed to-
wards encouraging private insurance cover effectively treat it as an
alternative system.22°
There are two primary forms of private insurance coverage: hos-
pital and ancillary cover. -1 Hospital insurance covers private hospital
stays or private patient stays in public hospitals." In recent years
there has been a strong trend towards provision in private hospitals.223
Hospital insurance pays for the cost of the hospital stay itself, subject
216 Lourenco et al., supra note 213, at 7-8,15-23 (providing overview of funding of Medi-
care and benefits provided).
217 Id. at 18. Nursing home, community care, and mental health care are also covered
by federal, state, and local programs. Id. at 50-56.
218 The proportion of the population covered by private insurance dropped from 50%
when Medicare was created in 1983-84 to 30.5% in June 1999. During 1999 it increased
slightly. PHIAC, supra note 53, at 1. In the mid-1960s, under the Page plan, as much as
seventy percent of the population had subsidized private insurance, but this level dropped,
in part because low-risk insureds grew weary of subsidizing high-risk insureds. Lourenco
et al., supra note 213, at 10-13.
219 See Wasem, supra note 120, at 82.
220 See infra notes 253-57.
221 As of June 30, 1999, 5.793 million Australians had hospital cover, of whom 4.423
million had ancillary cover as well, while 1.626 million had ancillary cover only. PHIAC,
supra note 53, at 116.
222 Australia had 312 private hospitals serving 1.875 million discharged patients in 1993-
99, as compared to 726 public hospitals serving 3.839 million patients. Commonwealth
Dep't of Health & Aged Care, Australia: Selected Health Care Delivery and Financing
Statistics-September 2000, tbL1, at http'./www.health.gov.aulhaf/ozhealthlozhstats.htm.
Private hospitals tend to be smaller, however, and treat simpler cases, though there are
certainly private hospitals that rival public hospitals in size and complexity of care. See
Lourenco et al., supra note 213, at 39-40.
223 See PHIAC, supra note 53, at 46.
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to whatever cost-sharing obligations are imposed by the policy, and, in
many cases, dependent on whether or not the fund has an agreement
with the particular hospital. 224 It also covers part of the fee of private
doctors for in-hospital care that is not covered by Medicare.225
Many doctors who provide services to private patients in private
hospitals also balance bill above and beyond the insurance payment-
a practice forbidden with respect to those who enter hospitals as pub-
lic patients.226 Thus, a patient with private insurance may end up pay-
ing far more if admitted as a private rather than a public patient.22 7
Private insurance plans are not permitted to pay for physician care out
of the hospital.
Since 1995, the government has attempted to get insurers to enter
into preferred provider agreements with hospitals and hospital-based
physicians in order to limit or eliminate balance billing (making possi-
ble "no or known gap policies") 228 and to institute simplified billing
arrangements so that insureds will understand their obligations bet-
ter.2 29 These moves have been resisted by organized medicine and are
proceeding slowly.230 Balance billing (gap obligations) remain an im-
portant and intractable issue.Z31
Ancillary cover pays for many services not covered by Medicare,
such as optometrist services and glasses, speech therapy, hearing aids,
ambulance services, physiotherapy, chiropractors, and most forms of
224 Doing the Health Insurance Tango-Your Guide to the Right Steps, Choice, Aug.
1998, at 16, 18-21 [hereinafter Health Insurance Tango].
225 If a patient is admitted as a public patient, Medicare covers the doctor's charges in
full. If the patient is private, Medicare pays seventy-five percent of a scheduled fee, and
private insurance pays the remaining twenty-five percent. Id. at 18. Doctors are permitted
to balance bill private patients, however, and many do. During 1994-95, for example, anes-
thesiologists charged $172.6 million, only $140.9 million of which was covered by insurance.
J.S. Deeble, Submission to the Inquiry into the Health Legislation (Private Health Insur-
ance Reform) Amendment Act 1995, at 12 (1996). A private patient, therefore, may end
up facing a hefty bill even after private insurance pays for a service that would be free to a
public patient.
226 See Gwen Gray, "No Gaps" Health Insurance: A Gain for Consumers or a Windfall
for Specialists?, 22 Austl. Health Rev. 18, 22-23 (1999).
227 Physician services in hospitals for public patients are covered fully by Medicare, and
balance billing is prohibited. See Jane Hall, Incremental Change in the Australian Health
Care System, Health Aff., May/June 1999, at 99-101.
228 See Gray, supra note 226, at 23-24.
229 Private Health Insurance (Austl.), supra note 210, at vi.
230 The government's preferred provider agreement policy has been branded as leading
to "U.S.-style managed care," which seems to be all one word, and which, it is assumed,
everyone knows from watching American television and movies is not what is wanted in
Australia. See, e.g., Rob Hodge, Is MBF's New Tendering Scheme Good for the Health
System? It's U.S.-Style Managed Care, Austl. Med., Oct. 4, 1999, at 12; Sally Nathan, Man-
aged Care or Managed Scare?, Consuming Interest, Spring 1997, at 12.
231 See Gray, supra note 226, at 22-25 (providing overview of recent political struggles
over gap insurance).
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dental care.Z32 Ancillary cover is commonly purchased as an adjunct
to hospital cover, but many persons purchase it as a free-standing
product3 3
As in many other countries, private hospital insurance in Austra-
lia permits those who purchase it to jump the queues found in the
public system, and to receive care more conveniently and in more
comfortable surroundings.234 Not surprisingly, private insurance pays
for a significant majority of hospital admissions for knee procedures
and for scope and lens procedures in Australia, while it pays for only a
small proportion of admissions for pulmonary or cardiac problems.3-5s
Private insurance in Australia is heavily regulated. Health insur-
ers must be registered with the government and are monitored care-
fully for solvency by the Private Health Insurance Administration
Council.236 Policies and premiums, and changes in policies and premi-
ums, must be filed with the Department of Health and Aged Care,
which may disapprove them.237 Complaints against private health in-
surers are investigated by a Private Health Insurance Ombudsman.2-s
Private insurance in Australia for the last half-century has been
community rated by law: That is, the same rate must be charged to all
applicants in the community, varied only by whether the insured unit
is an individual, couple, or family.239 This obviously makes health in-
surance very attractive to those who are worried about their health.
Insurers are quite concerned about "hit-and-run" purchasers, who ob-
tain coverage only until they have had their baby or gotten their knee
replacement.240 In fact, however, though insureds tend to be older,2 41
232 Private Health Insurance (Austl.), supra note 210, at 11.
233 PHIAC, supra note 53, at 38.
234 Deeble, supra note 225, at 4; Hall, supra note 227, at 101.
235 Private Health Insurance (Ausfl.), supra note 210, at 41.
236 Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 50-52; PHIAC, supra note 53, at 5.
237 Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 73-76.
23s See Private Health Ins. Ombudsman, Who We Are (n.d.) (explaining in brochure
ombudsman's services and philosophy), available at http/hwwv.phio.org.aufmission.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
239 See Hall, supra note 227, at 99.
240 Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 173-74.
241 Approximately forty-four percent of persons aged thirty-five to fifty-four, and forty
percent of those aged fifty-five to seventy-four, were privately insured in 1995, as com-
pared to twenty-seven percent of those aged twenty-five to thirty-four, and twenty-one
percent of those aged fifteen to twenty-four. Private Health Insurance (Austl.), supra note
210, at 13. Insurance coverage has stayed more or less constant for persons over sixty-five
over the past decade, while it has continued to drop steadily for persons under sixty-five.
PHIAC, supra note 53, at 22.
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they are also generally in good health,242 and, not surprisingly, wealth-
ier than average.243 The problem of adverse selection is controlled to
some extent by waiting periods that the funds are permitted to im-
pose-two months for coverage generally and twelve months for pre-
existing conditions and maternity coverage.244 Longer waiting periods
also are imposed for some kinds of treatment, such as in vitro fertiliza-
tion or bone marrow transplants.245
The incentives that insurers face for cream skimming-picking
off the better risks and discouraging high-risk insureds246-also are
reduced through the existence of a complex government-sponsored
reinsurance scheme.247 In brief, funds are transferred through the
scheme to insurers with disproportionately high proportions of pa-
tients who are over sixty-five or who have remained in hospital for
more than thirty-five days, from insurers whose insureds are under-
represented in these categories. 248 Well over half of the benefits paid
by insurers are for persons in these categories and thus subject to the
reinsurance scheme.249 While this may ameliorate the problem exper-
ienced by insureds, it makes insurance even less attractive to low-risk
insureds, who, according to one estimate, pay seventy percent more
for health insurance than is justified given their potential use of health
services.250 Insurers attempt to alter their benefits to make their poli-
cies less attractive to high-risk insureds (for example, by excluding
coverage for hip replacements) or to make them more attractive to
low-risk insureds (by offering, for example, discounts on athletic
242 Persons who rate their health as excellent are more likely to be insured privately
than those who rate it as poor, but the probability of having private insurance rises with the
number of chronic conditions. Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 188-89.
243 Seventy percent of the wealthiest quintile of families had private insurance, as com-
pared to twenty percent of the poorest quintile. Id. at 172.
244 The funds enforce the preexisting conditions clauses remorselessly, and many of the
complaints to the Health Insurance Ombudsman concern preexisting-condition disputes.
Interview with Matthew Blackmore, Executive Director, Consumers Health Forum, in
Canberra, AustI. (Oct. 15, 1999).
245 Health Insurance: Fate or Fortune?, Choice, Nov. 1999, at 24, 30-31.
246 See Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven et al., Access to Coverage for High-Risks in a Com-
petitive Individual Health Insurance Market: Via Premium Rate Restrictions or Risk-Ad-
justed Premium Subsidies?, 19 J. Health Econ. 311, 316 (2000) (defining cream skimming).
"Cream skimming" is the term of choice for this practice in Australia and also is used
elsewhere. In the United States, the practice is sometimes called "cherry picking," while in
Germany it is called "raisin picking."
247 See id. at 322-38.
248 This risk adjustment scheme will be modified under recently adopted legislation to
increase incentives for insurers to limit the costs imposed by these insureds. PHIAC, supra
note 53, at 18 (discussing modifications).
249 In 1998-99, insurers paid Austl. $1.483 billion in ordinary benefits and Austl. $1.582
billion in reinsurance account benefits. PHIAC, supra note 53, at 44.
250 Deeble, supra note 225, at 9.
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shoes),251 Policies also vary widely in terms of deductibles and coin-
surance and are priced accordingly in an attempt to correlate more
closely price and risk. a2
As noted already, private health insurance enrollment has de-
clined steadily since the establishment of Medicare. The current gov-
ernment, however, is committed strongly to stopping or reversing this
trend. To this end it has adopted a number of initiatives. First, under
a recent law, thirty percent of the cost of private health insurance is
covered by the government. a5 3 This represents an Austl. $1.5 billion
(approximately U.S. $900 million) subsidy for private health insurance
in 2000-01, compared to total Commonwealth Medicare expenditures
of about Austl. $12.1 billion (approximately U.S. $7.3 billion) in 1996-
97.254 Second, individuals with an income in excess of Aust. $50,000
(about U.S. $30,000), or families with an income above Austl.
$100,000 (about U.S. $60,000), must purchase private health insurance
or face a one percent additional tax on their income.25s Third, Austra-
lia recently has adopted a lifetime health cover premium scheme that
will require persons who purchase health insurance after July 1, 2000
to pay an additional two percent over the base premium for each year
after they turn thirty years old that they delay seeking cover.256 This
incremental premium is subject to a ceiling of seventy percent above
base premium. This scheme, it is hoped, will encourage Australians to
seek cover at an earlier age. To date, however, these carrots and
sticks seem to be having a minuscule effect on increasing private in-
surance coverage in Australia and come at a very high cost to the
government 5 7
251 See Indus. Comm'n, supra note 211, at 141-42 (discussing ways insurers compete for
low-risk customers). Funds have been able to exclude coverage of particular conditions
since 1995, but such exclusion is becoming increasingly common. Funds are required only
to cover psychiatric, rehabilitative, and palliative care and otherwise can exclude services.
See PHIAC, supra note 53, at 35.
252 See Health Insurance Tango, supra note 224, at 24-31 (comparing private insurance
prices and copayments for various Australian states and territories).
253 Private Health Insurance (Austl.), supra note 210, at v.
254 Id. at 10. The government expects reduced public spending of over Austl. $400 mil-
lion because of increased private coverage.
255 Id. at 12.
256 See Commonwealth Dep't of Health & Aged Care, Facts About Lifetime Health
Cover 1 (1999) (explaining Lifetime Health Cover program).
257 See, e.g., Ausfl. Consumers' Ass'n, Briefing Paper: In Response to the Coalition's
-Proposed 30% Rebate for Private Health Insurance 1-10 (1998) (arguing that income re-
mains best predictor of private health insurance coverage and calling for government re-
forms that would encourage providers to control costs and increase range of choices);
Philip M. Clarke, The Effect of the 30% Private Health Insurance Rebate on the Purchas-
ing Behaviour and Intentions of the Australian Population, 22 Austl. Health Rev. 7, 13-16
(arguing that premium changes have small effect on purchasing behavior at high cost); Jane
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In sum, Australia represents a market where private insurance is
regulated and cross-subsidized heavily, but also continues to retain a
large (though shrinking) consumer base and government support.
D. The Netherlands
Writing about the Dutch health care system from a distance is a
somewhat risky enterprise because it changes so often. In the late
1980s, the Netherlands, with great fanfare and international publicity,
embraced managed competition by adopting the Dekker proposal to
promote competition between public and private health plans.
258 This
plan was modified somewhat after a change of government in 1989,
and even more significantly by a subsequent government that took
office in 1994.259 Private health insurance has long played an impor-
tant role in the Dutch health care system. The Dekker plan foresaw
abolishing the distinction between social insurance and private health
insurance funds in a managed competition environment. Despite the
fact that a number of private insurers now are paired corporately with
social insurance funds, private insurance continues to enjoy an exis-
tence quite separate from the social insurance funds.
260
The current Dutch health insurance system is divided into three
layers or compartments. First and most basically, there is the Excep-
tional Medical Expense scheme (created by the Algemene Wet
Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ)) in which the entire population is
enrolled.2 61 This social insurance program covers long-term care,
mental care, care for the handicapped, and home care-essentially
long-term and catastrophic care that is not readily insurable through
private insurance.2 62 The second compartment covers basic medical
Hall et al., Whither Private Health Insurance?, 21 Austl. & N.Z. J. Pub. Health 119, 120
(1997) (arguing that offering financial incentives will affect only some potential insureds
and does not address fundamental problems with insurance market); Ian McAuley, Private
Health Insurance: Redefining the Issues, Austl. Rationalist, Spring 1998, at 8, 8-15 (1998)
(finding that incentives greatly benefited those who already had private insurance while
failing to win over those without it, and arguing that government's efforts to promote pri-
vate insurance may be misplaced).
258 Frederik T. Schut & Herbert E.G.M. Hermans, Managed Competition in the Nether-
lands and Its Lessons for Canada, 20 Dalhousie L.J. 437, 444-46 (1997) (explaining two
major components of Dekker proposal: guaranteeing universal access to basic health care
and creating incentives for insurers and providers to increase efficiency).
259 Id. at 444-45; see also Frederik T. Schut, Health Care Reforms in the Netherlands:
Miracle or Mirage?, 18 J. Pub. Health Med. 278, 280 (1996).
260 Frederik T. Schut & Eddy K.A. van Doorslaer, Towards a Reinforced Agency Role
of Health Insurers in Belgium and the Netherlands, 48 Health Pol'y 47, 57 (1999).
261 Association Internationale de la Mutualitd [International Insurance Association]
(AIM), Health Protection Systems Today: Structures and Trends in 15 Countries 134
(1999).
262 Id.
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care, including, for example, medical and surgical treatment, obstetric
care, hospital care, dental care for children, pharmaceuticals, rehabili-
tation care, ambulance transport, and speech therapy.2 63 About sixty-
three percent of the population receives payment for this care through
obligatory insurance with the sickness funds.264 An additional six per-
cent-certain kinds of civil servants-receive this care through special
public insurance programs2 65 The rest of the population, about
thirty-one percent, consisting primarily of salaried workers with an in-
come above a certain level,266 the self-employed, and retired persons
previously privately insured, are privately insured for these services.2 67
Private health insurance accounts for fifteen percent of total Dutch
health care spending.268 Though those eligible for private insurance
are not compelled to purchase it, virtually all do, and generally as indi-
viduals rather than as members of employment-related groups. Fi-
nally, the third compartment of supplementary or additional medical
care-such as dental care for adults, private rooms, and alternative
medicine-is insured through insurance plans purchased through the
social or private insurance funds, which are completely optional2 69
The supplementary or additional medical care insurance (the
third layer) is sold on a risk-adjusted basis and essentially is unregu-
lated.270 Second-level, basic health insurance is also sold by private
insurers in somewhat less competitive markets.2 71 Insurers are gener-
ally free to accept or decline applicants and can and do adjust premi-
ums for risk, particularly age.272 Insurance plans offer a variety of
coverages and cost-sharing arrangements.273 The fact that cata-
strophic care is covered by the AWBZ, of course, also makes adverse
selection, or "cream skimming," much less of a problem with respect
to the private insurance market.274
263 Id. at 138-39.
264 Id. at 137.
265 Id.
266 For 1999, this level of income was 64,300 guilders a year (about U.S. 28,000) or
more. Id. at 135.
267 Id. at 137.
268 Id. at 135.
269 Id. at 139.
270 Note, however, that insurers must meet solvency requirements.
271 AIM, supra note 261, at 145.
272 See van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at 311, 317 (arguing that in unregulated com-
petitive market insurers will risk-adjust premiums, and citing findings of premium differen-
tiation in Netherlands and United States). Despite this, Dutch private insurers do not
charge fully risk-related premiums. Kieke G.H. Okma, Health Care, Health Policies, and
Health Reforms in the Netherlands 12-13 (2000).
273 CEA, supra note 56, at 65.
274 See Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven & Frederik T. Schut, Should Catastrophic Risks Be
Included in a Regulated Competitive Health Insurance Market?, 39 Soc. Sci. Med. 1459,
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Nevertheless, basic health insurance is subject to a certain level of
market regulation, which seems to be increasing steadily in intrusive-
ness.275 Under the Health Insurance Access Act (Wet op de toegang
tot ziektekostenverzekeringen (WTZ)), insurers must offer a standard
package policy (providing cover comparable to that provided by the
social insurance funds) to certain statutorily qualified persons who ap-
ply within four months of meeting eligibility criteria.276 The coverage
and cost-sharing arrangements provided under the standard package
policy are determined by government regulation. 277 Among those eli-
gible for the standard package are: (1) persons who are required to
leave the social insurance program; (2) persons who were uninsured
and did not know or reasonably could not be expected to know that
they presented above-average risks; (3) persons moving to the Nether-
lands previously insured elsewhere; and (4) persons over the age of
sixty-five who previously had some other form of private insurance.278
Since 1991, privately insured persons who pay more than the maxi-
mum standard policy premium for their age group also may opt for
the standard policy, as may privately insured students since 1992.279
About fourteen percent of private insureds have the standard package
policy.280
Premiums for the standard policy are currently set at about 2880
guilders (approximately U.S. $1490) annually for adults, or 2650 guil-
ders (approximately U.S. $1610) annually for senior citizens. 281 These
premiums do not cover the full cost of insuring these groups, so pri-
vate insurers must cross-subsidize. All insurers must participate in a
risk-sharing reinsurance pool and collect a solidarity contribution
from all other insureds, which is shared through the pool.28 2 Private
insureds also are required to contribute to a second solidarity pool
(the MOOZ) to subsidize the social insurance funds in which elderly
members are overrepresented.2 3 The government also has had plans
for some time to transform private insurance into something more
1465-66, 1470-71 (1994) (arguing for different regulatory regime for catastrophic risks be-
cause of greater profit incentives for cream skimming when catastrophic risks are insured,
which results in loss of access, efficiency, and social welfare).
275 See Okma, supra note 272, at 8-9 (discussing reasons for this regulation).
276 AIM, supra note 261, at 144; Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport, Health Insurance
in the Netherlands 35-36 (4th ed. 1998).
277 Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport, supra note 276, at 36-38.
278 Id. at 35.
279 Id. at 36.
280 AIM, supra note 261, at 144.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 See id. at 136. Solidarity contributions for 1999 were set at 237.6 guilders for pri-
vately insured individuals aged twenty to sixty-four. Id.
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closely resembling social insurance by instituting open enrollment re-
quirements, rate banding, and a risk pooling scheme, though no move-
ment is being made to implement these reforms at present. 4 In sum,
though private insurance is sold in private markets, they are markets
characterized, as elsewhere in the world, by increasing government
intervention and mandated cross-subsidization.
E. The United States
Other developed nations have a different concept of social equity
than that which has evolved in the United States. It is not surprising
that nations that embrace a solidarity principle are reluctant to let
markets alone determine access to health care, or even to allow unreg-
ulated markets for private insurance covering basic health care ser-
vices. When, however, we examine private insurance regulation in the
United States, at least as it affects individual and small group policies,
we see much the same phenomenon that we observe in other nations:
health insurance sold in heavily regulated, tax-subsidized markets.
In the American federal system, the regulation of insurance, in-
cluding health insurance, has been the task of the states.285 The states
have long required that health insurers be licensed, and they have reg-
ulated health insurers with respect to solvency and policy provi-
sions.26 Increasingly in recent years, however, the states have
regulated insurance-rating and underwriting practices as well.;
s7
Though most private health insurance in the United States is provided
through employee benefits plans, where the reach of state regulation
is limited federally by ERISA,2 state insurance regulation is saved
from ERISA preemption, 9 and ERISA has not had the deregulatory
impact here that it has had in other areas of benefits regulation.290
284 Schut & Hermans, supra note 258, at 451-52 (discussing long-term aim of "a com-
plete convergence of sickness funds and private health insurers").
285 This allocation of responsibility was confirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945, which presumed the absence of federal insurance regulation. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1994).
286 See O.D. Dickerson, Health Insurance 435-52 (1959) (discussing provisions and ad-
ministration of state regulation and efforts toward national uniformity).
287 In the early years of health insurance, regulators eschewed rate regulation because
there were a wide variety of contract forms, little cooperation among insurers, and gener-
ally competitive rates. Edwin J. Faulkner, Health Insurance 497 (1960)
M Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998); see also Furrow et al., supra note 117, §§ 8-3 to -5 (discussing ERISA
preemption).
289 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A) (1994); Furrow et al., supra note 117, § 8-3(b).
290 Self-insured plans, however, are exempt even from state insurance regulation. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
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Health insurance in the United States for much of the past cen-
tury has been sold predominantly to employment-related groups.2 91
With respect to individuals and small groups, risk-based underwriting
and experience rating have long been the norm.292 This has resulted
in some individuals and small groups finding insurance to be very, and
sometimes even prohibitively, expensive.2 93 Persons who are self-em-
ployed or employed by small businesses are far less likely to be in-
sured than are those employed by large businesses. Only about half of
employers with fewer than 200 employees offer health insurance ben-
efits, while nearly all employers with more than 200 do So.29
4
In hopes of making health insurance more affordable to small
businesses and the self-employed, nearly every state has adopted
small-group and individual market reforms during the past decade.29
5
Many of these reforms are now mandated under the 1996 federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
HIPAA amended ERISA, the Public Health Services Act, and the In-
ternal Revenue Code, to improve, among other things, the portability
and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individ-
ual markets.296 HIPAA has four main consequences. First, it limits
291 Somers & Somers, supra note 101, at 228-46 (describing origins and development of
health insurance plans in industrial relations context). A recent study found that only
about 6.6% of individuals under the age of sixty-five in the United States relied on individ-
ual coverage as their primary means of insurance. This amounts to only about twenty
percent of the potential market, i.e. of those who are not otherwise insured. Pauly &
Percy, supra note 41, at 11, 14.
292 Blue Cross plans in their early years followed community rating principles, offering
the same premium to all applicants. Somers & Somers, supra note 101, at 309-10. From
the outset, however, commercial insurers used experience rating and risk underwriting.
Dickerson, supra note 286, at 329-55; Somers & Somers, supra note 101, at 274-76, 309-10.
293 This generally translates into lower-wage workers having worse access to and having
to pay more for insurance. Only forty-three percent of workers earning less than $7 per
hour were offered job-based benefits, compared to ninety-three percent of workers earning
more than $15 per hour, while the average monthly employee contribution for low-cost
health insurance for workers earning less than $7 per hour was $130, compared to $84 a
month for workers earning more than $15 per hour. Peter J. Cunningham et al., Who
Declines Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Is Uninsured? 2-3 (Ctr. for Studying
Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 22, 1999), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENTS/
46/46.pdf.
294 See Paul B. Ginsburg et al., Tracking Small-Firm Coverage, 1989-1996, Health Aff.,
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 167.
295 Esther Hing & Gail A. Jensen, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996: Lessons from the States, 37 Med. Care 692, 693-95 (1999); Gail A. Jensen &
Michael A. Morrisey, Small Group Reform and Insurance Provision by Small Firms, 1989-
1995, 36 Inquiry 176, 176 (1999).
296 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41 (Supp. IV 1998); see also
Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing: The Group
Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, 7 Annals Health L. 183, 184-87 (1998) (describing portability and renewal guarantees
as new federal baseline).
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the extent to which health plans may impose preexisting-conditions
limitations.297 Second, it prohibits discrimination by group health
plans against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health
status.298 Third, it requires insurers who market insurance in the small
group market (to employers with two to fifty employees) to guarantee
coverage and renewability to small employers who seek coverage.299
Fourth, it requires insurers who sell individual insurance policies to
make them available to certain individuals who had been covered pre-
viously by group policies.
300
Though all states are now obligated to implement the require-
ments of HIPAA (or have HIPAA requirements directly imposed
through federal regulation),3 0 1 many states enforced similar provisions
before its adoption with respect to small group markets.302 Thirty-
eight states had guaranteed issue and forty-three had guaranteed re-
newal requirements in small group markets before HIPAA.30 3 Forty-
five states had imposed restrictions on preexisting conditions clauses
before HIPAA.3°4 Indeed, a number of states currently go beyond
HIPAA in limiting preexisting conditions clauses, including three
states that outlaw them altogether in small group markets and ten ad-
ditional states that impose stricter limits than does HIPAA?3o5
Though HIPAA does not address insurance premiums, many
states do, at least in small group markets306 Thirty-five states impose
297 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(a); see also Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and
Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care
Plans?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 485, 497-99 (1998) (stating that "key to HIPAA's coverage porta-
bility is the reduction of the period of... coverage exclusion by the participant's prior
creditable coverage").
298 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)-(b).
299 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a)(1).
300 Id. § 300gg-41(a)(1).
301 See Furrow et al., supra note 117, § 9-7.
302 Some states also did not take steps immediately to implement HIPAA's require-
ments, resulting in federal enforcement in those states. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Rep. No. GAO/HEHS-98-67, Health Insurance Standards: New Federal Law Creates
Challenges for Consumers, Insurers, Regulators 18-21 (1998), available at httpj
www.gpo.gov/.
303 Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Mandated Benefit Laws and Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance 4 (1999).
304 Id.
305 Blue Cross/Blue Shield, State Legislative Health Care and Insurance Issues, 1998
Survey of Plans (1999).
306 Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform
Laws, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 685, 693 (1999) [hereinafter Hall, Competitive Impact]
(noting that while HIPAA did not impose rate restrictions, many states have done so);
Mark A. Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating Reforms, 37
Inquiry (forthcoming Winter 200012001) [hereinafter, Hall, Rating Reforms] (manuscript
at 5, on file with the New York University Law Review) (describing states' rate
restrictions).
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rating bands, limiting premiums charged to small groups to a band
range of two-to-one for experience, health status, or duration of cov-
erage, as recommended by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. 307 The trend seems to be toward tighter rating bands.
Six states impose tighter rating bands,30 8 while seventeen states re-
quire community rating insofar as they prohibit rating based on expe-
rience, health status, or duration of coverage. 30 9 New York, one of the
most restrictive states, even limits variance of premiums based on age.
Most states also limit durational rating (churning) by limiting how
much an insurer can increase a particular subscriber's rates at the time
of renewal relative to the insurer's average increases.310 Every state,
however, permits rates to vary based on the richness of benefit cover-
age, size of insured unit, and geographic location.31' Ten states also
have adopted mandatory reinsurance pools, and twenty have volun-
tary reinsurance pools, assuring that insurers that end up carrying
high-risk groups can spread some of their risks to insurers with more
favorable risk experience. 312
States also have been active in regulating individual health insur-
ance markets. The most common individual market reform is guaran-
teed renewal, required by HIPAA but adopted by twenty-one states
before HIPAA.31 3 Thirty-one states have adopted restrictions on pre-
existing conditions limitations covering persons beyond those who
must be covered under HIPAA. Among other individual market re-
forms adopted by the states are restrictions on the use of experience,
health status, or duration for setting premiums (eight states); prohibi-
tions against the use of experience, health status, or duration of cover-
age in underwriting (eleven states); provision for voluntary or
mandatory participation in reinsurance pools (nine states); and desig-
307 Blue Cross/Blue Shield, State Legislative Health Care and Insurance Issues, 1999
Survey of Plans (2000).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Hall, Rating Reforms, supra note 306 (manuscript at 14); see also infra note 362
(explaining churning). Hall notes that some states apply these limits only within rating
blocks, allowing insurers to raise rates at different levels for different policies. This appar-
ently has encouraged insurers to act just like their counterparts responding to similar re-
strictions in Chile: They simply tinker with the benefits, issue a new policy, and raise rates.
Hall, Rating Reforms, supra note 306 (manuscript at 15). Some states have attempted to
address this problem by limiting the ability of insurers to manipulate policy forms. Id.
(manuscript at 16). Adjustment of policies for benefit differences remains an intractable
problem, however. Id. (manuscript at 22-24) (describing states' strategies to prevent ad-
justment of policies for benefit differences).
311 Blue Cross/Blue Shield, supra note 305.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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nation of minimum loss ratios, or the percentage of premiums that
must be paid out in dlaims (nine states).3 14
HIPAA mandates health plan coverage for all individuals who
lose group coverage, regardless of health status or claims experience,
if the individual has had at least eighteen months of prior continuous
coverage without a lapse of sixty-three or more days since the most
recent group coverage.315 Relatively few individuals fit this precise
description and qualify for this benefit3 16 Moreover, states may opt
out of this requirement by providing an acceptable alternative mecha-
nism. In fact, as of December 1998, only thirteen states were comply-
ing with the HIPAA-guaranteed issue alternative, while the remaining
states relied on another alternative.3 17 Twenty-five states provided
coverage through high-risk insurance pools,318 mostly funded through
premiums and assessments on insurers, which charge premiums of up
to between 125% and 250% of the average premium for individual
coverage319 and impose high cost-sharing requirements and relatively
low annual and lifetime maximums.3 20
In the end, these state regulatory requirements seem to have had
a limited positive, and perhaps even a negative, impact on the extent
of insurance coverage in small group markets.312' The requirements
probably have had a quite negative impact on the extent of insurance
coverage in individual markets, though the reforms probably have
helped some individuals and firms that otherwise might not have been
able to secure insurance.32 HIPAA probably has had an even less
314 Id.
315 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
316 Chollet & Kirk, supra note 42, at 16 (noting that narrowness of HIPAA eligibility
categories means that few individuals will qualify).
317 Id. at 15-17 (noting that even of those thirteen states requiring all insurers participat-
ing in individual market to guarantee issue of one or more products to all applicants, only
four states require guaranteed issue of all products).
318 See Sally C. Steams et al., The Structure and Experience of State Risk Pools: 1988-
1994, 54 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 223, 223-24 (1997).
319 See id. at 228.
320 See id. at 227.
321 See Hing & Jensen, supra note 295, at 70 (noting that states' small group reforms had
mixed results).
322 See generally Jensen & Morrisey, supra note 295 (noting that states reforms had
limited impact on extent of coverage and that individual coverage has declined despite
reforms); Leigh Page, Insurance Reform Effect: Coverage Drop, Am. Med. Ne%%S, Sept.
21, 1998, at 5 (noting that states' reforms have caused net decline in individual and small
group coverage according to two recent studies); see also Stephen Zuckerman & Shruti
Rajan, An Alternative Approach to Measuring the Effect of Insurance Market Reforms,
36 Inquiry 44,53-54 (1999) (arguing that small group reforms may have forestalled further
deterioration in small group markets, though they have not increased insurance coverage,
but individual market reforms have been accompanied by increased uninsurance). On the
other hand, research sponsored by the Heritage Foundation found a dramatic increase in
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beneficial effect.323 On the other hand, the disastrous effects that
some predicted the reforms might have on insurers have not material-
ized either.32 4 Insurers have remained in business in virtually all
states, even those that have adopted rigorous reforms.
32 5
Even in the United States, therefore, we see that pure competi-
tive markets for health insurance are not tolerated where they really
would make a difference, in the small group and individual markets.
Since large groups essentially community rate at the group level,
326
and HIPAA forbids differential premiums or coverage denials on the
basis of health status within groups, pure risk-based competitive mar-
kets for health insurance are almost as rare in the United States as
they are elsewhere in the world.
F. Alternative Approaches to Private Insurance: Canada, the United
Kingdom, and France
A high and escalating level of government involvement in health
insurance markets is not, however, unavoidable. Something more
closely approximating the competitive ideal of private health insur-
ance markets exists in a number of nations.
In Canada, for example, where basic health care services are cov-
ered by the federal/provincial basic health insurance scheme and sev-
eral provinces proscribe the purchase of private insurance to cover
uninsured rates in states with the strictest insurance regulation. See Melinda L. Schriver &
Grace-Marie Arnett, Uninsured Rates Rise Dramatically in States with Strictest Health
Insurance Regulations 1 (Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1211, 1998). These findings
were to some extent contradicted by an Urban Institute Study reviewing the same data.
See Page, supra, at 5. Finally, for the argument that state reforms have been largely inef-
fective in expanding coverage, see Frank A. Sloan & Christopher J. Conover, Effects of
State Reforms on Health Insurance Coverage of Adults, 35 Inquiry 280, 289 (1998).
323 See Geri Aston, Insurance Reform Law Falls Short, Am. Med. News, Sept. 14, 1998,
at 1 (noting that HIPAA has not achieved results anticipated by legislators).
324 Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 699 (noting that small group insurance
markets have remained stable following reform). This has been less true in individual mar-
kets, though with the exception of Kentucky and Washington, states adopting individual
market reforms have been able to maintain relatively healthy markets. See Adele M. Kirk,
Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky,
and Massachusetts, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 133, 139-40, 151-53 (2000) (describing de-
cline in Washington and Kentucky individual insurance markets following reform); Len M.
Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L.
175, 194 (2000) (noting that while reforms did not cause market collapse, neither did they
decrease dramatically numbers of uninsured).
325 Kentucky is the only state in which individual markets collapsed after the adoption
of reforms, though the situation in Kentucky was in many respects unique. See Kirk, supra
note 324, at 147-58 (describing Kentucky reform experience).
326 Everyone in the group pays the same premium for the same coverage, regardless of
health status. See Thomas R. Oliver, Dynamics Without Change: The New Generation, 25
J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 225, 227 (2000).
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services covered by the public program, nearly fifteen million persons
have private health insurance, almost exclusively for services not cov-
ered by the public program, such as private hospital rooms, vision and
dental care, hearing aids, chiropractors, and prescription drugs.3 '7
These health plans usually are provided by employers, though em-
ployees often are required to contribute to the premiums.328 Private
health insurance is government-subsidized to the extent that employ-
ers can exclude from their income their contributions to employee
health benefit plans, and employees are not taxed on these benefits.- 9
Private insurance rates, however, are not regulated, except insofar as
provincial civil rights laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of age,
sex, or handicap that is not bona fide and reasonable 3 30 The percent-
age of health care expenses in Canada covered by the private sector
has been growing in recent years, in part because the government is
defining more and more services as nonessential or not "medically
necessary," and thus not covered,331 and because of the growing cost
of medications, most of which are covered by private insurance.3-
327 Graig, supra note 79, at 137-38; Flood, supra note 116, at 29. At the end of 1998,
14.889 million Canadians had extended health insurance, and 7.547 million had dental in-
surance. Private health insurance plays a similar role in Japan. See Graig, supra note 79, at
99 (noting that individuals cannot opt out of Japan's national insurance program, but pri-
vate insurance covers benefits not included in national program).
328 Graig, supra note 79, at 138.
329 Id.; see also Flood, supra note 116, at 30 (noting that private insurance is subsidized
through tax deductions).
330 Flood, supra note 116, at 30. In fact, only a very small percentage of applicants are
denied coverage as uninsurable (two percent according to one report from Quebec), but
higher-risk applicants are charged higher rates. See Can. Life & Health Ins. Ass'n, The
Place of the Private Sector in the Health Care Field § 1.12. (1999) [hereinafter Can. Life &
Health Ins. Ass'n, Place of the Private Sector], http-.//%wvw.clhia.ca/submissionsfquebec
privpq_.doc.html. Health insurers are regulated by the federal Office of Superintendent
of Financial Institutions for solvency and fiscal responsibility. See Can. Life & Health Ins.
Ass'n, Canada's Life and Health Insurance Industry- The Regulatory Environment 3
(1997), http'/www.clhia.ca/submissions/sub3_d.htm.
331 See Joan M. Gilmour, Creeping Privatization in the Health Care System: Implica-
tions for Women as the State Re-Draws Its Role 18-20 (Apr. 13, 2000) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that economic concerns
have driven Canadian government to deem more services not "medically necessary").
332 Ted Schrecker, Private Health Care for Canada: North of the Border, an Idea
Whose Time Shouldn't Come?, 26 J. Law, Med., & Ethics 138, 140 (1998) (describing
growing private spending on health expenses); Can. Life & Health Ins. Ass'n, Place of the
Private Sector, supra note 330, § 1.3.2 (arguing that increased private spending is driven in
part by increasing cost of medications). In 1997, Quebec established a Drug Insurance
Plan, which might indicate a move away from essentially unregulated insurance markets.
Under this plan, residents of Quebec are required to carry insurance for pharmaceuticals,
which is covered either by a public plan or by private plans. A risk pool has been estab-
lished among participating group plans to share the risk of high-cost cases. See Can. Life
& Health Ins. Ass'n, Submission Concerning the Report on the Evaluation of the General
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Similarly, private health insurance covers twelve to thirteen per-
cent of the population in the United Kingdom, where it largely serves
the function of allowing insureds to queue jump, but also allows in-
sureds to choose their hospital or surgeon.333 About sixty percent of
private medical insurance coverage in the United Kingdom is pro-
vided by employers, but employer-paid premiums are taxable to em-
ployees. 334 Though the Thatcher government established tax subsidies
for some who purchased private insurance, 35 these were abolished
when Labour returned to power.
In the United Kingdom, insurers are free to risk underwrite as
long as they do not discriminate against the disabled.336 An investiga-
tion of the private health insurance industry by the Office of Fair
Trading in the late 1990s resulted only in tepid recommendations that
insurers should come up with a more transparent means of communi-
cating the content of insurance coverage through the use of "core
term products," either discontinue or explain better to potential pur-
chasers the use of "moratorium underwriting" (insurance sold without
underwriting but with long preexisting conditions clauses), and warn
initial purchasers that premiums are likely to increase in the future at
rates substantially in excess of inflation.337 These recommendations
are being implemented partially by the insurance industry, and further
government regulatory action apparently is not being
contemplated. 338
Finally, about eighty-five percent of French families have private
insurance purchased from either a commercial insurer or a Mutuelle
(descendants of the guild funds).339 Private insurance now covers
about twelve percent of national health expenditures, much of which
consists of cost-sharing obligations imposed under the public insur-
Drug Insurance Plan §§ 1.1 to .2 (2000), http://www.clhia.calsubmissions/medpq/
meden_f.html.
333 Graig, supra note 79, at 163. Indeed, some insurance contracts only cover services if
the NHS waiting lists are of a certain duration. See Private Health Insurance, supra note
189, at 86-89 (comments of William Laing).
334 Graig, supra note 79, at 164.
335 See Rob Baggott, Health and Health Care in Britain 153 (1994) (describing policies
of Conservative government to expand private health insurance coverage).
336 Insurers, however, may exclude only psychiatric care, cosmetic surgery, and treat-
ment of chronic diseases. Private Health Insurance, supra note 189, at 87 (comments of
William Laing).
337 Office of Fair Trading (U.K.), Health Insurance: A Second Report by the Office of
Fair Trading 5-6 (1998), http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/rsearch/reports/oft230.htm.
338 See id. at 10-11.
339 E-mail from Sophie Bancet, General Counsel's Office, La Mutuelle Grn~rale des
PTr, to Tmothy Stoltzfus Jost, Professor, Ohio State University (Apr. 19, 2000) (on file
with the New York University Law Review).
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ance plan.340 About sixty percent of private insurance is purchased
through groups, forty percent by individuals&341 Private insurance is
offered on an indemnification basis and effectively insures against the
cost-sharing obligations imposed on patients under the national social
insurance scheme, as well as for expenses not covered (such as the
extra charge for a private room).
3 42
French insurers are generally free to risk-underwrite and to de-
cline applications for insurance based on risk. 4 3 They are subject to
some limits, however. Insurers may exclude preexisting conditions if
the condition has been referred to expressly as excluded by the policy
and the insurer proves that it was preexisting at the time the contract
issued, but otherwise are limited in their ability to exclude coverage
for preexisting conditions to those excluded from coverage by the na-
tional social security system.344 If insurers choose to insure a group,
they must insure all members of the group.345 After two years of cov-
erage, an insurer cannot refuse to renew an insured or raise premiums
based solely on medical condition.346 Thus private insurance is regu-
lated more heavily in France than in Canada or the United Kingdom,
though initial underwriting is subject to few regulatory constraints.
Though the health care systems of these three nations are quite
different, the function of private insurance within them is quite simi-
lar. In each of these countries, private insurance is provided predomi-
nantly through employment-related group contracts primarily as a
fringe benefit and less often is purchased in individual markets,
though individual markets exist in all three countries. Further, in each
country private insurance plays merely a supplementary role, covering
frills and amenities not covered by comprehensive insurance schemes.
340 Joseph White, Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and Interna-
tional Experience 105-06 (1995).
341 E-mail from Sophie Bancet to Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 339.
342 CEA, supra note 56, at 43-44.
343 Id. at 44 (contrasting statutory health insurance, in which contributions are fixed
without reference to risks, with private health insurance, in which insureds' contributions
depend on nature and extent of risks); E-mail from Sophie Bancet, General Counsel's
Office, La Mutuelle Gdndrale des PIT, to Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Professor of Law, Ohio
State University (Apr. 20, 2000) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
344 Protection sociale compl6mentaire [Complementary Social Protection], in Diction-
naire Permanent Assurances [Permanent Insurance Dictionary] 3557,3588 (1997) (explain-
ing French law requiring coverage of preexisting conditions); see also id. at 3595
(explaining conditions under which preexisting conditions may be excluded).
345 Id. at 3588.
346 Id. at 3595-96.
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III
THE ANALYTIC BASIS OF HEALTH
INSURANCE REGULATION
From these case studies we see that, even in the United States,
private health insurance is highly regulated and often government
subsidized wherever it is relied upon as a primary means for purchas-
ing essential health care services for a significant portion of a nation's
population. Insurance also seems to be more highly regulated and
subsidized where individual, as compared to group, policies
predominate. What explains the pervasiveness of private insurance
regulation in these examples?
To begin, when an insured purchases insurance, she pays money
up front in exchange for the insurer's promise to pay a contingent
claim if and when it eventuates in the future. Both the future capacity
and the willingness of the insurer to pay when a claim is presented are
important to the insured. Both problems are addressed by regulation.
The problem of capacity to pay is dealt with almost everywhere
through licensing, capitalization, and reserve requirements, as well as
by periodic reporting and financial examinations. 347 The problem of
unfair claims practices (of unwillingness to pay) traditionally has been
addressed by the courts (applying the doctrines of contra profer-
entem, reasonable expectations, and bad faith to compel insurers to
pay wrongly denied claims),3 48 and by regulators through the specifi-
cation or prohibition of contract clauses and regulation of claims
practices. 34
9
Our concern here, however, is not with solvency and claims prac-
tices regulation, but rather with regulation of underwriting of premi-
ums and of contract limitations and exclusions. In the first five case
studies just reviewed, this form of regulation seems quite common,
though its intensity and prevalence varies from country to country.
Chile, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States all
attempt to use private insurance to cover the primary health care
347 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. No. HRD-94-26, Health Insurance Regulation:
Wide Variation in State's Authority, Oversight, and Resources 8-10 (1993) (discussing
shortcomings in current state oversight of insurance company solvency); Peter M. Lencsis,
Insurance Regulation in the United States: An Overview for Business and Government
25-51 (1997) (addressing licensing of insurers, insurers' assets, reserves, and investments,
and annual statements and periodic examinations); Chollet & Lewis, supra note 96, at 87-
89 (discussing standards for insurer entry and exit).
348 See Abraham, supra note 50, at 101-32 (exploring these doctrines); Tom Baker, Con-
structing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract
Damages, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1395 (1994) (analyzing bad faith breach of contract doctrine).
349 See Dickerson, supra note 286, at 440-43; Faulkner, supra note 287, at 485-96: Chol-
lett & Lewis, supra note 96, at 89-90.
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needs of important segments of their population. For reasons that are
intuitively obvious and have long been understood, however, private
health insurance purchased by private parties in unregulated and un-
subsidized markets is simply incapable of covering whole populations.
In competitive insurance markets, no single insurer can choose to
offer the same price to all purchasers of insurance (i.e., to "community
rate" voluntarily).3 50 Any insurer that tried to do so obviously would
have to charge a rate high enough to break even-that is, a rate high
enough to cover the costs anticipated from extraordinarily expensive
cases as well as the cost of a much higher number of more moderately
expensive services. The distribution of health care costs over a popu-
lation in any given year, however, is extraordinarily skewed. The most
expensive one percent of the insured population accounts for thirty
percent of all medical care costs, while the least expensive fifty per-
cent are responsible for only three percent of costs 3 51 Thus, for an
insurer dedicated to community rating to cover the costs it will face
from extraordinarily expensive insureds, it will have to charge hefty
premiums to many insureds who in fact will incur no insured expenses
over the course of the year, many of whom will not anticipate any
health care expenses at the outset.
Faced with sizeable premiums and little anticipation of need for
insurance, some low-risk insureds undoubtedly will decline insurance
coverage, choosing to self-insure (unless the purchase of insurance is
mandated) 35 2 and perhaps spending more on prevention. High-risk
insureds, on the other hand, will find community-rated insurance very
attractive 3 53 In other words, insurers will be at risk for "adverse se-
lection" (the preferential election to insure by high-risk
individuals).3 54
350 The classic demonstration of this is found in Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629 (1976).
351 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An
Update, Health Aff., Winter 1992, at 145, 146 ex.1; see also Gauthier et al., supra note 69,
at 15, 17 (finding that thirty-five percent of insureds do not submit claim in any given
month, and five percent account for vast majority of claims). One large University of Cali-
fornia plan discovered that 227 individuals accounted for forty-two percent of reimburs-
able hospital costs during the 1982-83 contract year, while in another University health
plan, 0.04% of Blue Cross enrollees accounted for 21% of reimbursements. IOM, supra
note 98, at 178-79 (discussing impact on health plan costs of small group of individuals who
require high level of care).
352 Jacobi, supra note 26, at 387-88 (arguing that social policy should favor programs that
result in inclusion of everyone).
353 Hall, supra note 40, at 11.
354 See id. (defining "adverse selection"); Wortham, supra note 40, at 844 (-Insurers fear
adverse selection because it means that the group of people who actually purchase a partic-
ular insurance coverage will not have the same characteristics as the group on whose past
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If, however, as would be expected in competitive markets, at least
one insurer offers insurance at a lower price, low-risk insureds will
abandon the high-cost insurer and flock to the new entrant.3,55 But
high-risk insureds will do so as well, seriously threatening the viability
of the lower-cost insurer. The lower-cost insurer may try to discour-
age some high-risk insureds by offering a less generous product, for
example, a product subject to lower caps or higher cost sharing, or
covering fewer services. 356 If the lower cost insurer succeeds, how-
ever, high-risk insureds discouraged from moving to the low-cost in-
surer will remain with the higher-cost, higher-coverage insurer, which
will now need to raise its premiums to cover the ever more expensive
population it has retained. 357 As it does so, however, its policies will
become even less attractive to those low-risk insureds who had re-
mained loyal to it. An insurer who community rates voluntarily, in
the end, will slip into the insurance "death spiral," as it is left with an
ever less favorable risk pool and must charge ever higher rates.358
High-option plans will be driven out of the market by adverse selec-
tion.359 In short, a stable "pooling equilibrium," in which every in-
sured remains in a common pool paying the same amount for
insurance is not possible in competitive health insurance markets 60
losses premiums were calculated."). Adverse selection may occur either when insurers are
unable to identify high-risk applicants or when rate regulation limits their ability to re-
spond, by acting on their identification of such applicants. Van de Ven et al., supra note
246, at 316. There is considerable evidence of the existence of adverse selection when
health plans are required to accept all eligible applicants at a fixed price, as in the federal
COBRA continuation coverage program, or where, as in the Federal Employees Health
Benefits program or the California Public Employees Retirement System, beneficiaries can
choose between high and low benefit option plans. Hall, supra note 40, at 40-41.
355 Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 350, at 636.
356 Mark V. Pauly, Is Cream-Skimming a Problem for the Competitive Medical Mar-
ket?, 3 J. Health Econ. 88, 92 (1984).
357 Jacobi, supra note 26, at 388-89.
358 Id. at 389. Insureds anticipating increased use of medical care, such as maternity
care, conversely may switch from low- to high-benefit plans. See James C. Robinson et al.,
Health Plan Switching in Anticipation of Increased Medical Care Utilization, 31 Med. Care
43 (1993) (using data from patients expecting increased need for maternity care to support
hypothesis that individuals switch health plans in anticipation of changing medical care
needs).
359 See generally M. Susan Marquis, Adverse Selection with a Multiple Choice Among
Health Insurance Plans: A Simulation Analysis, 11 J. Health Econ. 129 (1992) (demon-
strating this through simulation based on Rand Health Insurance experiment).
360 Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 350, at 634-37 (discussing equilibrium in market
with combination of high-risk and low-risk individuals). This phenomenon may be a
greater problem in theory than in practice. There is some evidence that individual insureds
are in fact willing to pay premiums in excess of the actuarially accurate marginal cost of
coverage for that individual, particularly if the alternative is doing without insurance.
Jacobi, supra note 26, at 389-91.
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If however, at least one insurer risk underwrites or "experience
rates,"' 361 offering higher rates for higher-risk applicants and lower
rates for lower-risk applicants, the market will sort itself out into a
"separation equilibrium."'362 Low-risk insureds will leave high-cost,
one-rate-fits-all insurance plans for lower-cost alternatives calibrated
to their level of risk.3 63 Community-rated plans will be forced to
move to risk underwriting or be priced out of the market. This is pre-
cisely what happened in the United States during the middle of the
last century, as Blue Cross plans, many of which originally were com-
munity rated, lost the low-risk end of their business to experience-
rated commercial insurers, who offered more attractive rates, and
eventually adopted experience rating themselves.364
Low-risk insureds, however, may not only find community-rated
plans a bad deal, but they simply may be unable to afford them. 36S
Low-risk insureds in the United States are often young persons who
have just entered the job market, and many may not yet have even a
permanent or fuiltime job.366 One-size-fits-all insurance rates set high
361 To "experience rate" is to offer rates to groups or to individuals based on experience
with health care costs. Furrow et al., supra note 98, at 463.
362 See Pauly, supra note 356, at 90 (giving formula for equilibrium annual premiums
when prices are set tailored to risk). Another underwriting strategy used by insurers to
control risk is durational underwriting, or "churning": offering very low premiums to low-
risk groups, and then raising premiums by 50% to 100% (or even refusing to renew) a year
or two later as the effectiveness of the initial screening wears off and the group's risk
profile regresses to the mean. See Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 6S8. A
perfect separation equilibrium, in which every insured pays his or her own projected costs,
is not possible because the administrative costs involved in achieving such a result would
be prohibitive for the insurer. IOM, supra note 98, at 169.
363 Neoclassical economic theory would argue that the separation equilibrium in this
situation is the efficient result. See Wortham, supra note 40, at 858-59 (summarizing neo-
classical economic theory arguments).
364 Hall, supra note 40, at 14; see also Abraham, supra note 50, at 72-73 (discussing
advantages of experience rating); Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform
and Risk Adjustment, Health Aft., Spring 1994, at 132, 133-34 (using history of Blue Cross
as evidence of importance of risk selection).
365 See Deborah L. Rogal & Anne K. Gauthier, Introduction: The Evolution of the
Individual Insurance Market, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L 3,7 (200l0). One study found that
cost was cited sixty-four percent of the time as the main reason persons remained unin-
sured in the United States. Karen Donelan et al., Whatever Happened to the Health In-
surance Crisis in the United States?, 276 JAMA 1346, 1348 (1996).
366 See Cunningham et al., supra note 293, at 2-3 (noting strong correlation between low
hourly wage and likelihood of being uninsured); Findlay & Miller, supra note 460, at 7-8
(noting that many young and nontraditional workers are often uninsured); Henry S. Farber
& Helen Levy, Recent Trends in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage: Are
Bad Jobs Getting Worse?, 19 J. Health Econ. 93, 95 (2000) (noting that new and part-time
workers are less likely to be covered by insurance). This is one of the arguments most
often made against the cross-subsidy aspect of group insurance coverage. See Hoff, supra
note 19, at 103 (pointing out that young workers, who subsidize insurance for old and sick
under group insurance, often earn less than old and sick workers do); Ture & Entin, supra
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enough to cover the expenses of all insureds simply may be too high to
fit into their budgets.367 In fact, in the four years following the adop-
tion by New York of required community rating in the individual mar-
ket in 1993, individual enrollment dropped by at least thirty-eight
percent and possibly by as much as fifty percent.368 During the same
four years, one major New York insurer reported that the average age
of its individual indemnity pool increased by 11.5 years.369 Commu-
nity rating, when applied to small groups, decreases both insurance
offer and purchase rates by five percentage points because of loss of
low-risk firms and insureds, even though it also increases accessibility
for high-risk firms and individuals.370
However, when plans underwrite based on individual, or even
small group, risk and experience, they may charge premiums that
high-risk individuals and groups find simply unaffordable, or plans
simply may refuse to sell to some high-risk individuals when they are
not required legally to do so.371 Insurers in the United States that sell
in the individual market often exclude or limit coverage for maternity
care, mental health, substance abuse treatment, or HIV-related ex-
penses; charge high deductibles and coinsurance amounts; and impose
note 22, at 125 (arguing for free-market pricing and providing assistance only to those for
whom premiums constitute hardship).
367 See Pauly & Percy, supra note 41, at 21. One hoped-for effect of tax credit proposals
is that subsidies would make insurance rates, based on rating restrictions, more attractive
to low-risk insureds. See Merlis, supra note 24, at 8-9 (comparing subsidies without simul-
taneous rate reform, which will result in increased likelihood of low-risk insureds obtaining
coverage, with subsidies and simultaneous rate reform, which will have smaller-though
still positive-effect on low-risk coverage).
368 Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York's Reform Law, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y &
L. 71, 72, 76 (2000) (discussing effect of insurance market reform on individual enroll-
ment). Small group enrollment, on the other hand, increased after the reforms were
adopted. Id. at 77, 79.
369 Id. at 87. Other major insurers also reported that their average number of claims for
individuals, hospital days per thousand insured, and prevalence of AIDS and cirrhosis
among insureds were far higher in the New York individual market than in the group
market. Id.
370 Joan L. Buchanan & M. Susan Marquis, Who Gains and Who Loses with Commu-
nity Rating for Small Business?, 36 Inquiry 30, 38, 40-41 (1999).
371 Chollet & Kirk, supra note 42, at 48; see also Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note
306, at 688 (explaining practice of "ridering out," whereby insurers exclude certain condi-
tions or decline to cover high-risk patients). An Office of Technology Assessment found
that eight percent of individual insurance applicants in 1987-88 were rejected outright, thir-
teen percent were insured with exclusion waivers, five percent were charged higher premi-
ums, and two percent were subjected to both exclusion waivers and higher premiums.
Stone, supra note 76, at 307. On the other hand, a recent study of the individual insurance
market finds that, while persons who self-report fair or poor, as opposed to good or excel-
lent, health status are less likely to have individual coverage, the difference is modest.
Pauly & Percy, supra note 41, at 15, 17.
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lengthy preexisting condition exclusions where permitted to do so.372
They charge rates as much as 50% to 200% higher than their standard
rates for conditions such as obesity, tobacco use, and hypertension,
and may deny coverage for a history of angina, stroke, or rheumatoid
arthritis.373 Insurers compelled under HIPAA to offer individual in-
surance policies to individuals who lost group insurance charged rates
up to 600% above standard rates.3 74 Many individuals or employers
therefore have had to pass up health insurance simply because of its
cost.375 Regardless of whether plans are community-rated or experi-
ence-rated, therefore, some individuals will not be able to find cover-
age at an affordable price.
376
Moreover, insurers have means other than risk underwriting to
control adverse selection. Preexisting condition exclusions or cover-
age waiting periods make insurance plans less appealing to high-cost
insureds. 377 Caps on coverage (either lifetime, enrollment period, or
condition-specific coverage caps) likewise can discourage those in ill
health from purchasing insurance.3 78 These devices, sometimes re-
ferred to as "postclaims underwriting," discourage adverse selection,
but also limit the risks faced by insurers when it occurs.3 79 Finally,
benefit packages can be designed to include or exclude benefits or
providers of particular interest to low- or high-risk groups.3s0
Ample evidence also can be found of risk segmentation,
favorable selection, and the use of devices such as exclusions and caps
to limit risk in loosely regulated health insurance markets outside the
United States. As noted above, in Chile the elderly and disabled are
372 See Chollet & Kirk, supra note 42, at 38-43 (summarizing these practices).
373 Id. at 49-51.
374 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 302, at 8.
375 See Duchon et al., supra note 20, at 4-5 (noting that fourteen percent of employees
declined to participate in job-based plans, and nearly half of those cited cost as reason);
Findlay & Miller, supra note 460, at 5-6 (noting that six million fewer people took health
care from their employers in 1996 than in 1987 despite increase in number of small busi-
nesses offering coverage); Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in
Health Insurance Coverage, 1979-1995, Health Aft., MarJApr. 1999, at 30, 45 (-More
workers were uninsured in 1995 than in 1979 because rising health care expenditures made
insurance unaffordable for a growing number of workers."); see also Jensen & Morrisey,
supra note 295, at 184 (stating that ninety percent of small employers identified cost of
coverage as reason why they were not offering insurance to their employees).
376 A recent study of New Jersey's Individual Health Coverage Program found minimal
evidence of adverse selection, but noted that this might result from the fact that premiums
offered under the plan were high and not affordable to many high-risk insureds. Katherine
Swartz & Deborah NV. Garnick, Can Adverse Selection Be Avoided in a Market for Indi-
vidual Health Insurance?, 56 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 373, 386 (1999).
377 IOM, supra note 98, at 173; Chollet & Lewis, supra note 96, at 83-84.
378 Chollet & Lewis, supra note 96, at 83-84.
379 Hall, supra note 40, at 19.
3s0 IOM, supra note 98, at 173-74.
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largely excluded from private insurance, women wage-earners are dis-
criminated against, and caps and preexisting condition exclusions are
common (to the extent that they are permitted).38 It also appears
that even though insurance coverage through friendly societies was
quite common in pre-NHS Britain, women, the very poor, and those
at high risk for needing medical care, had difficulty securing
coverage. 3
82
The exclusionary effects of risk-underwritten private insurance
are mitigated to a considerable degree when insurance is sold to em-
ployment-related groups.383 Employment-related groups, especially
large groups, are able to spread risk broadly, making insurance more
affordable to higher-risk individuals. In effect, they community rate
at the group level rather than the insurer level. 384 As only persons
healthy enough to work and their dependents are included in such
groups, the risk exposure faced by an insurer or self-insured employer
who insures a group is controlled to some extent.385 If the employer
covers most of the cost of the insurance itself as a business expense,
moreover, low-risk employees may not be aware of the extent to
which they are subsidizing their higher-risk coworkers. Where em-
ployment-related insurance is tax subsidized, as it long has been in the
United States, insureds may be troubled even less by cross-subsidiza-
tion.386 Historically, therefore, group health insurance in the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and other countries has
had the effect of making private insurance more available.
381 See supra Part II.A.
382 The most thorough study of this topic is found in Green, supra note 99. Though
Green's main argument is that socialized medicine was a mistake in Britain, and that Brit-
ain instead should have relied on the growth of private coverage through the friendly socie-
ties, he does admit that coverage was far from universal prior to 1948 and that these groups
in particular faced difficulties obtaining coverage. Id. at 100-06.
383 Indeed, some of the tax credit proposals would require employers to continue to
offer insurance plans to their employees, recognizing the important role of employers as
facilitators in health insurance markets. See Steuerle & Mermin, supra note 21, at 85-86.
384 The early pioneers of employment-related group health insurance in the United
States understood this and supported group-based insurance because of it. See IOM, supra
note 98, at 67 (noting that use of employee group model was key to managing risk pool).
385 Although some plans still cover retirees, this coverage is usually secondary to Medi-
care; thus, risk exposure is somewhat controlled.
386 See Alan C. Monheit et al., How Are Net Health Insurance Benefits Distributed in
the Employment-Related Insurance Market?, 32 Inquiry 379, 389 (1995). According to
one study, individuals who are eligible for tax-subsidized, employment-based coverage are
twenty-four times more likely to have health insurance than those who must buy it as
individuals. Tanner, supra note 30, at 32. One potential problem of moving to individual
tax credits, however, is that it would break down the community cross-subsidization as-
pects of group coverage, as low-risk individuals would leave groups for cheaper individual
coverage and high-risk individuals would be pushed out of plans to lower the costs of
group coverage. Merlis, supra note 24, at 12-14.
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Because unregulated private health insurance markets leave high-
risk individuals with very costly, often simply unaffordable, premiums,
or apply other terms and conditions, such as lengthy preexisting condi-
tion exclusions, that make affordable insurance of little value, nations
that rely on individual private insurance policies for providing primary
cover to portions of their populations almost inevitably regulate (usu-
ally quite extensively) and often subsidize private insurance markets
to mitigate these results.387 In other words, they conscript private in-
surance to serve the public goal of equitable access.
Regulation in some nations begins with attempts to require com-
munity rating, or at least to limit the extent of risk underwriting and
experience rating.3  This is the case in Australia, and to a lesser ex-
tent Germany, the United States, and the Netherlands.3 s9 Most coun-
tries also restrict or prohibit insurers from canceling or refusing to
renew insurance for individuals or groups as they become higher risk
with time or in fact incur substantial expenses. This is the case in
Chile, Australia, the United States, and Germany.390 In many places,
rating restrictions grow more complex over time, as insurers adjust to
them and figure out ways to avoid them.391
Simply requiring that all insurance purchasers be offered the
same rates (subject usually to adjustment for size of insured unit-
individual, couple, family-and perhaps for age or gender) will not
suffice, however, to assure access to insurance.392 As noted above, by
excluding preexisting conditions for long periods of time, barring cov-
erage for high-cost or chronic conditions, or imposing low maximum
387 See Nichols, supra note 324, at 180-81. Risk-based underwriting and other insurer
practices aimed at countering adverse selection have other deleterious effects that also
encourage public regulation. First, the possibility of adverse selection may discourage
plans from offering benefits that might attract high-risk insureds, thus leaving these per-
sons without important coverage. Second, insureds may fail to submit claims to insurers
for fear that doing so will result in increased rates or in loss of coverage. IOM, supra note
98, at 182.
388 Van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at 312-13.
389 See supra text accompanying notes 194 (Germany), 239 (Australia), 271-74 (Nether-
lands), 307-12 (United States).
390 See supra text accompanying notes 171-72 (Chile), 203-04 (Germany), 239 (Austra-
lia), 315 (United States).
391 Professor Hall, an astute observer of insurance regulation in the United States, con-
cludes: "Competitive insurance markets are inherently complex, so more complex reforms
are fitting. However, complex reforms require careful monitoring to eliminate all of the
possible avenues for circumvention.... Avoiding... larger-scale problems requires careful
construction of the rules and diligent monitoring of their implementation." Hall, Rating
Reforms, supra note 306 (manuscript at 30).
392 Moreover, it also can be one factor which leads to withdrawal of insurers from the
highly regulated market, leaving a less competitive environment. See Hall, Competitive
Impact, supra note 306, at 699-703 (detailing impact of small group reforms on competi-
tiveness in New York market).
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coverage limitations (including disease-specific caps), insurers can de-
feat the whole purpose of government efforts to extend coverage to
high-risk individuals. 393 Private insurance coverage effectively will be
denied to high-risk persons unless the use of these limitations is re-
stricted, or perhaps even outlawed. Most nations in which private in-
surance plays an important role, therefore, including Chile, France,
the United States, and Australia, place limits on the extent to which
insurers can impose these clauses and restrictions.394
Insurers denied the use of these obvious restraints on coverage,
however, can resort to still more subtle devices to skim the cream
from markets and to avoid high-risk insureds. Insurers compelled to
community rate can expect one-third of their insureds to be unprofita-
ble, with the maximum predictable loss exceeding eight times overall
average per capita expenditures. 395 This creates significant incentives
for cream skimming through whatever avenues are open. Some pri-
vate insurers in Australia, required to sell policies on a community-
rated basis, reportedly opened offices on the upper floors of buildings
without elevators to limit accessibility by those in frail health.
Insurers may shape their benefit packages to include health club
dues or discounts on running shoes, or to exclude long-term care or
mental health care, in an effort to encourage low-risk and discourage
high-risk applicants. 396 They may refuse to pay commissions to agents
who sell certain types of insurance or who sell insurance to certain
types of customers, and may encourage "field underwriting," where
agents simply do not sell insurance to certain potential consumers.3 97
If reforms grandfather in existing policies, insurers may close their ex-
isting products to new entrants and offer new products with less
favorable benefits. 398 Other insurers may attempt to skim cream
through selective advertising, providing poor service to high-risk indi-
viduals, sharing risk with contracting providers to give the providers
393 See Nichols, supra note 324, at 180-81.
394 See supra text accompanying notes 175-76 (Chile), 244-45 (Australia), 296 (United
States), 304, (same), 344 (France).
395 Van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at 331.
396 Alexander K. Feldvebel & David Sky, A Regulator's Perspective on Other States'
Experiences, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 197, 202 (2000) (describing how benefit design
achieves resegmentation). Professor Hall refers to these practices as "gerrymandered ben-
efit packages." Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 694.
397 Mark A. Hall, The Role of Independent Agents in the Success of Health Insurance
Market Reforms, 78 Milbank Q. 23, 35-43 (2000) (concluding that while field underwriting
is widespread, no evidence exists that it is undermining core reform laws); see also Kirk,
supra note 324, at 170 (noting that risk segmentation is "something akin to a physical law
in insurance," as reformed markets resegment if permitted).
398 Deborah J. Chollett, Consumers, Insurers, and Market Behavior, 25 J. Health Pol.
Pol'y & L. 27, 38 (2000).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 76:419
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INSURANCE
an incentive to cream skim, or simply bribing high-risk insureds to
leave the plan.3 99 In the United States, one widely used strategy for
avoiding individual and small group reforms is to establish "associa-
tion plans" which purport to be group plans, free from the constraints
of individual market reforms, but which can be used to cream skim
from the regulated individual market. 400
Insurers may not need even to take actions aimed at excluding
particular individuals: Simply limiting choice of provider may be suffi-
cient to exclude individuals who are currently high users of medical
care because they may be reluctant to sever current ties with particu-
lar providers.401 One industry source quoted by Mark Hall candidly
stated that regulators "can't hold a candle" to the abilities of insurers
to promote risk selection.4°2 Resources committed to cream skim-
ming, however, result in a welfare loss for society, as cream skimming
simply shifts risk to other parties, often to those least able to bear it,
rather than providing a benefit to society.40
3
Regulators may address the problem of subtle forms of cream
skimming by attempting to alter the incentives faced by insurers. One
approach is for regulators to use reinsurance or high-risk pool
schemes to make higher-risk insureds more attractive to insurers and,
conversely, to make cream skimming less attractive.404 Reinsurance
or high-risk pool schemes indeed may be necessary to keep insurers
with too many high-risk insureds from leaving the market alto-
399 Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 694; van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at
321.
400 See Berry & White, supra note 23, at 209 (noting adverse selection results where
there is regulated individual coverage and unregulated association coverage); Hall, supra
note 41, at 181 (finding that associations "offer an attractive, cheaper option for younger,
healthier small groups"); Kirk, supra note 324, at 154 (finding "considerable potential for
adverse selection against the community-rated portion of the market").
401 See Fred J. Hellinger, Selection Bias in HMOs and PPOs: A Review of the Evi-
dence, 32 Inquiry 135, 141 (1995).
402 Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 722 (describing impact of small group
health insurance market reforms in 1990s on market competition).
403 See van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at 320 (demonstrating impact of cream skim-
ming by inefficient insurers). It is always possible, however, that insurers will react to
underwriting limitations by trying to manage costs rather than risk. A reasonably vigorous
market for individual health insurance continued to exist in New York after the imposition
of very restrictive underwriting reforms because insurers switched to managed care plans,
reducing the costs of their products. See Chollet, supra note 398, at 42; Hall, Competitive
Impact, supra note 306, at 707-09.
404 See van de Ven et al., supra note 246, at 326-28 (evaluating various means of prevent-
ing cream skimming). For descriptions of the operation of reinsurance in the American
context, see Hall, Rating Reforms, supra note 306 (manuscript at 44-47). Some advocates
of tax credit or voucher proposals for subsidizing private insurance would adjust the
amount of the voucher or credit for risk to make it of value to high-risk individuals. See
Hoff, supra note 19, at 102-07.
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gether.405 The Australian and the Dutch WTZ reallocation pools are
good examples of this. Alternatively, premiums paid to insurers can
be risk adjusted through some kind of prepayment pooling mecha-
nisms.40 6 Risk pooling in various forms is used in public and private
insurance systems in Colombia, Ireland, Germany, Switzerland, the
Czech Republic, Israel, the Netherlands, in the United States Medi-
care+Choice program, and in a number of states of the United
States. 40 7 Operation of these pools, however, requires extensive and
intrusive government involvement in private health insurance mar-
kets.40 8 There is also always the possibility that insurers may be able
to predict risk better than the risk adjustment mechanism and use this
information to cream skim low-risk patients or to dump high-risk
patients.40
9
Finally, as community rating and risk adjustment make the
purchase of insurance less and less attractive to the young and
healthy, a number of nations have chosen to subsidize the purchase of
private insurance to make it more affordable to those who otherwise
might not purchase it. Absent sizable subsidies, individual insurance
405 The individual health insurance market in the United States is characterized by a
large number of small-volume insurers whose existence is very tenuous if they are com-
pelled to take on high-risk insureds. See Chollet, supra note 398, at 40 (highlighting differ-
ences between individual and group markets).
406 See Jacobi, supra note 26, at 393-400 (summarizing concept of risk adjustment);
Joseph P. Newhouse, Risk Adjustment: Where Are We Now?, 35 Inquiry 122, 123 (1998)
(discussing arguments for risk-adjustment and current state of risk-adjustment technology).
Some advocates of tax credits propose risk adjusting tax credits to obviate the need for
rating restrictions. See Mark Pauly, Extending Health Insurance Through Insurance Cred-
its, in Options for Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 24, at 32,33 (describ-
ing credits as nonintrusive means of reducing uninsured population). Another approach
simply would be to tie the amount of tax credits to the premium actually paid, though this
approach would pose obvious cost control problems. See Meyer et al., supra note 31, at 30-
31 (analyzing administrative burdens presented by common proposals for tax reform).
407 See Ashley Files & Margaret Murray, German Risk Structure Compensation, 32 In-
quiry 300, 304 (1995) (discussing German risk-sharing requirements); van de Ven et al.,
supra note 246, at 328 (discussing use of various subsidy-premium schemes). See generally
Daniel L. Dunn, Applications of Health Risk Adjustment: What Can Be Learned from
Experience to Date?, 35 Inquiry 132 (1998) (describing current applications of risk adjust-
ment in United States); Katherine Swartz & Deborah W. Garnick, Lessons from New
Jersey, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 45 (2000) (describing operation of one relatively suc-
cessful effort at establishing risk sharing program as part of individual market reforms).
408 Risk adjustment schemes also are applied in public programs that contract with man-
aged care organizations in the United States (such as the Medicare+Choice program) and
are also necessary to avoid risk selection where large employer group plans or purchasing
cooperatives offer individual enrollees a choice of plans to avoid cherry picking. See
Gauthier et al., supra note 69, at 17 (summarizing problem of risk selection and discussing
potential consequences on certain populations and viability of health plans).
409 Newhouse, supra note 406, at 125.
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remains unaffordable to many.410 As noted above, Australia recently
adopted a policy of reimbursing privately insured individuals thirty
percent of their health insurance premiums. 41 Chileans may take the
seven percent payroll tax that otherwise would go into the social in-
surance program to purchase private health insurance.412 In the
United States, current tax subsidies for employment-related insurance
cost nearly $125 billion in 1998,4 1 over half the amount spent on the
Medicare or Medicaid programs. The current tax credit and voucher
proposals in the United States would serve the same end, though with-




Throughout the developed world we see that where private insur-
ance is relied upon as a primary means of health insurance coverage,
and also where it is predominantly sold on an individual rather than
group basis, it invariably is regulated to overcome the barriers to ac-
cess that occur naturally in insurance markets where adverse selection
and cream skimming are permitted to exist. This regulation seems to
follow a fairly natural progression, beginning perhaps with limitations
on preexisting conditions exclusion clauses or minimal coverage man-
dates, progressing through community rating requirements or other
bans on risk underwriting, and ending up with publicly sponsored risk
410 See Swartz & Garnick, supra note 407, at 68 (discussing issues raised by Individual
Health Coverage Program in New Jersey). As noted above, individual insurance currently
covers only about twenty percent of those not otherwise insured in the United States.
Pauly & Percy, supra note 41, at 13-14.
411 See supra text accompanying note 253.
412 Of course, in countries like Australia and Chile, which have parallel public and pri-
vate systems, the redirection of tax revenue to pay for private insurance, in part, is in
recognition of the fact that privately insured persons relieve the burden of the public, tax-
financed system.
413 Shejls & Hogan, supra note 62, at 178 (critiquing distribution of federal health bene-
fits tax expenditures to population with highest incomes).
414 See generally Gruber & Levitt, supra note 31. Among the many problems posed by
tax credit proposals is the fact that tax credits at the level being mooted simply will not
purchase much insurance, even for the healthy. One analysis notes that, in the individual
market, a $500 children's policy would either buy a policy with a S10,00D deductible or a
policy with first-dollar coverage and a $1600 benefit maximum. A $500 credit for adults
would buy a policy with a $67,000 deductible or first-dollar coverage ith an S840 cap.
Blumberg, supra note 24, at 34-35. Expansion of tax credits, on the other hand, would in
all likelihood result in many employers dropping health insurance coverage, leading to an
overall increase, rather than decrease, in the numbers of uninsured. See generally Large
Health Insurance Tax Credits Seen Destroying Employer-Provided Coverage, Health Care
Daily Rep. (BNA), June 9,2000, WL 619/2000 HCD d12.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
adjustment systems. Tax subsidies of private insurance are also ubiq-
uitous. On the other hand, where private health insurance plays a
purely supplemental role, and also where it is sold predominantly to
large groups, it is regulated to a lesser extent, and private markets
govern.415
Without further study, one only can speculate what the political
forces are that drive this tendency towards regulation and subsidiza-
tion. All of the nations studied, however, are democracies. Although
Chile was ruled by a military dictator at the time it established essen-
tially unregulated private insurance markets, as it has returned to de-
mocracy it has regulated private insurance increasingly. Clearly
democratic governments, whether or not they expressly embrace a
solidarity principle, will not tolerate purely competitive markets for
health insurance, because the resulting separation equilibria are too
inequitable. Health insurance seems to be viewed not as an economic
good, available to those who can afford it and choose to purchase it,
but rather, at least in part, as a "merit good," or perhaps not even as a
good at all, but rather as something that should be available to all
regardless of ability to pay.4 1 6 Low-risk voters, indeed, may support
health insurance market restrictions, realizing that, though the restric-
tions often disfavor them in the short run, the restrictions may ensure
that if and when the low-risk individuals become high-risk individuals,
insurance will be available.417 Recent opinion polls find that even in
the United States, ninety percent of those polled favor "making sure
that all families and children have access to affordable health insur-
ance," and sixty-nine percent of Americans, including more than half
of Republicans polled, are willing to pay higher taxes to ensure cover-
age for the uninsured.418 Even nations that have social or tax-based
415 One apparent exception to this observation is Medicare Supplement (Medigap) in-
surance in the United States, which supplements a public insurance program, but also is
heavily regulated. See Furrow et al., supra note 117, § 9-8. Medicare cost-sharing obliga-
tions are so high, however, and Medicare's gaps so broad (e.g., noncoverage of prescription
drugs), that Medigap insurance, in fact, plays more than a mere supplemental role. Also,
the elderly and disabled population that purchases Medigap insurance arguably needs spe-
cial regulatory protection.
416 See generally David S. Bloch & William Robert Nelson Jr., Defining "Health":
Three Visions and Their Ramifications, 1 DePaul J. Health Care L. 723 (1997) (discussing
policy implications of viewing "health" as either nongood, merit good, or economic good).
417 Nichols, supra note 324, at 186-87.
418 Robert Wood Johnson Found., supra note 46. In the same poll, seventeen percent
said that they or a family member had gone without insurance at some point during the
previous three years, and an additional forty-three percent said that they personally know
someone who had been uninsured. Twenty-six percent said that either they or a family
member had had to delay receiving medical treatment because of lack of insurance. Id.
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insurance do not seem to be able to tolerate unregulated private insur-
ance markets unless coverage is limited to nonessential health care.
On its face, moreover, this political drive would not seem to be
led by narrow special interests. Insurers and health care providers un-
doubtedly favor liberal subsidies for private health insurance 41 9 and
also may favor some forms of regulation as a lesser evil than abolition
of private insurance.420 On the whole, however, it would seem that
political support for the forms of regulation we have seen is broad-
based in most countries.421 A number of the current tax credit pro-
posals, for example, would maintain high levels of government regula-
tion of private insurance, including requirements such as rating band
limitations and creating state reinsurance risk pools. 4 " Unless one
values markets more than democracy (as did Pinochet), one must ac-
cept the fact that the populace does not want pure, unregulated mar-
kets for private health insurance.
423
As this seemingly irresistible impulse towards equity drives gov-
ernment intervention in private health insurance markets to become
increasingly intrusive, however, private insurance begins to resemble
ever more closely a public program.424 Private insurers acting as pri-
419 See, e.g., Kahn & Pollack, supra note 21.
420 The particular circumstances of some insurers may, in fact, make them vigorous ad-
vocates of reform. Blue Cross plans pushed for individual market reform in a number of
U.S. states to maintain the viability of their position as insurers of last resort. In the
United States, however, most insurers largely have opposed reforms, and political support
for reforms often has proved fragile and transient. Robert B. Hackey, The Politics of Re-
form, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L 211, 219-20 (2000).
421 In the United States, insurance reforms also undoubtedly are driven by the fact that,
given a lack of consensus for the provision of public insurance, cross-subsidization through
market reforms is the best that advocates of universal coverage can hope for. See Nichols,
supra note 324, at 182.
422 See Nancy W. Dickey, AMA Proposal for Expanding Coverage (2000) (advocating
for alternatives to employer-sponsored coverage subsidies), http:/lwww.rwjf.org/
rw_news_andevents/eventshc2000lamal.htm. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce proposal
would also establish risk pools. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Affordable Access to Quality
Health Care, Health Coverage 2000 (focusing on enhancing employer-based coverage),
http:/viwv.rwjf.orgapprw-news-and-eventsleventshc2*000bak-newvluschamberfnl2.htm.
The Heritage Foundation proposal for tax credits recognizes that regulatory responses may
be necessary to deal with the adverse selection and cream-skimming problems that under-
mine private insurance markets, but does not endorse specific solutions. John Shells et al..
Nat'l Coalition on Health Care, Health Insurance and Taxes: The Impact of Proposed
Changes in Current Federal Policy (1999) (comparing Heritage Foundation proposal to
more equitable proposals for extending tax subsidies that do not address resulting increase
in costs), http'/www.nchc.org/releasesthealthinstaxes10_18_99.html.
423 For a more elegant exposition of this subject, see Mark A. Hall, Public Choice and
Private Insurance: The Case of Small Group Market Reforms, 1998 U. I11. L Rev. 757,
760-61.
424 This point often is made by those who challenge regulation of private insurance. See.
e.g., Arnett, supra note 14, at 6-7. Advocates of deregulation argue that regulation makes
private insurance less accessible to the uninsured. while this very well may be true, the
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mary insurers more and more become constrained in their ability to
respond to the consumer preferences of their insureds as they are con-
scripted to serve the redistributional goals of government.425 The ar-
guable benefits of private health care finance-its agility, flexibility,
and capacity for innovation-are crippled as the government increas-
ingly dictates the terms of the insurance relationship. A low-risk in-
surance applicant who wants to buy a policy with long preexisting
condition exclusions (since she has no preexisting conditions), or with
low rates reflecting her low risk, cannot find one for sale. The insurer
who dreams up a new product to capture a niche market must face a
daunting gauntlet of regulatory approvals and limitations. To their al-
ready considerable administrative expenses, all insurers now must add
regulatory compliance costs. 426
Further, subsidized private insurance is subject to one of the most
important inefficiencies attending public insurance. Arguably one of
the most significant advantages of private insurance over public is
lower societal cost: Public insurance is paid for through taxes, and tax
collection in itself imposes costs. 427 The individual who purchases life,
fire, or theft insurance in a competitive market chooses freely how
much insurance he wants and how much money he is willing to pay for
it.428 The price he chooses to pay is equivalent to the value of the
policy to him. The utility derived from public health insurance by an
individual probably bears no necessary relationship to the marginal
tax rate of thirty to forty percent he pays in the United Kingdom for,
among other things, a tax-based insurance program, or the payroll
taxes of eleven to thirteen percent, on top of income taxes, that he
pays in Germany for a social health insurance program. 429
If, as often will be the case for a healthy, productive individual,
the utility derived is far less than the cost, the individual may waste
money pursuing tax loopholes, or even, at the margin, forego produc-
opposite is also true: Unregulated insurance markets also will exclude many of the
uninsured.
425 As one prominent American health policy expert has noted, we could eliminate the
problem of cherry picking and the need for risk adjustment mechanisms completely if we
only had one private insurer, but then we must ask why this kind of arrangement would be
more efficient than public provision. Katherine Swartz, Reducing Risk Selection Requires
More than Risk Adjustments, 32 Inquiry 6, 7 (1995).
426 Hall, supra note 423, at 774.
427 See Danzon, supra note 33, at 36-37; Shieber & Maeda, supra note 39, at 18-19.
428 See Epstein, supra note 19, at 52.
429 Knox, supra note 86, at 63 (presenting average contribution rates in 1990 for various
categories of German sickness funds as percentages of gross wages approximately under
$27,000); E-mail from Paul Fenn, Professor, University of Nottingham Business School, to
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Professor of Law, Ohio State University (Mar. 15, 2000) (on file
with the New York University Law Review).
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five activity altogether to avoid additional payroll taxes. 430 The "ex-
cess burden" of taxation-the indirect economic losses from the
disincentives taxation imposes-has been estimated to be as high as
two dollars for every dollar raised.431 This deadweight loss, to which
also must be added the compliance costs of collecting taxes, supports a
substantial argument against public provision.
When, however, private insurance is funded through fully refund-
able tax credits, as in American proposals, or direct public rebates, as
in Australia, this deadweight loss attributable to public insurance also
attends private insurance. Tax money now is simply paying for private
rather than public insurance; it still needs to be collected. Even tax
exclusions and deductions for private health insurance, as are com-
mon throughout the world, encourage inefficient behavior and impose
deadweight losses, as the advocates of tax credits are fond of pointing
Out.
432
As noted early on in this Article, one also must remember that
private insurance is more expensive than public insurance from the
outset because it must cover costs not experienced by public systems,
such as marketing, increased risk, and underwriting (though, of
course, underwriting costs are significantly decreased if underwriting
is largely prohibited).433 Individual policies are also much more ex-
pensive than group policies -with equivalent benefits. Finally, creating
a bureaucracy to administer a tax credit program for the purchase of
insurance also will impose additional administrative costs.43 One
therefore must ask again, when publicly regulated and subsidized sys-
tems resemble public systems so closely, what justifies the added cost
of private systems?435
430 Danzon, supra note 33, at 36-37.
431 J6nsson & Musgrove, supra note 80, at 57 (citing Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance
and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 5055, 1995)).
432 See Pauly, supra note 47, at 58 (arguing for replacement of tax exclusion with "better
system"); Tanner, supra note 30, at 29-32 (explaining how third-party private insurance
payment of health care bills increases health care costs).
433 See Blumberg, supra note 24, at 34, 35 (describing "risk pool problems" and "large
administrative loads"); see also supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
434 See Sherry Glied, An Assessment of Strategies for Expanding Insurance Coverage
18 (1999).
435 Clark Havighurst, one of the most articulate spokespersons for private markets in
health care, has raised the same challenge, noting:
Although a single-payer system might be only a second-best solution to our
cost problems, a strong argument can be made for preferring it over the cur-
rent regime of private intermediaries that lack-and do not appear even to
want-the tools that are needed to tackle the cost problem at its root.
Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Health Care Financing?, in American Health
Policy. Critical Issues for Reform 87, 88 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993). Professor
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Arguably, these additional costs may be offset by the additional
value that private insurers may offer their customers, for example by
devising innovative approaches to managing health care costs or as-
suring quality.436 Private health care insurers in the United States
have been able to thrive during the past decade, even in states in
which they have been regulated heavily, when they have taken inno-
vative approaches to manage costs provided through managed care
rather than simply trying to manage risk, as they traditionally have
done.437 In most of the countries examined above, however, private
insurers have been unwilling to engage in aggressive bargaining with
providers, and in some countries they are barred legally from doing
so.438 In most countries private insurers are price takers, and often
pay higher prices than do public programs for practitioner services
because their primary selling point is that they offer a better class of
services than does the public system.439
Managed care innovations, moreover, have occurred at the inter-
face between health plans and providers, not between health plans
and their insureds. There is no inherent reason, moreover, why public
as well as private insurers could not negotiate better deals with profes-
Havighurst blames insurers, as well as the law, for the absence of innovative, contract-
based solutions to the problem of health care costs. See id. at 96-98.
436 See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 33, at 26 (describing methods used by private insurers,
including "structured copayments, utilization review, case management, [and] selective
contracting with preferred providers"). In fact, American health economists seem more
concerned about the problem of health care costs, and particularly with the ramifications
of the problem of moral hazard for these costs, than with the issue of access. See generally
Evan M. Melhado, Economists, Public Provision, and the Market: Changing Values in
Policy Debate, 23 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 215 (1998) (tracing history of this trend).
437 See Hall, Competitive Impact, supra note 306, at 725-26 ("The movement toward
managed care represents a profound shift in the nature of competition .. and methods of
competing based on risk selection are now greatly reduced in some states.").
438 In Australia, where recently adopted laws encourage insurers to negotiate payments
with doctors, the Australian Medical Association has vigorously resisted such negotiations.
See Nathan, supra note 230, at 12 (describing "vocal campaign" Australian Medical Associ-
ation has waged against contracts between private health care funds, hospitals, and doc-
tors). Similarly, in Chile, private insurers are moving very slowly towards managed care, in
part because of expected resistance from organized medicine. See Jost, supra note 121, at
876-77. In Germany, private insurers pay doctors on the basis of a fee schedule, which is
established by law. Wicks, supra note 195, at 31-32.
439 In Australia, for example, privately insured patients often have to pay an extra
amount above their insurance cover for physician services in hospital, even though physi-
cian services in hospital are covered fully for public patients. See Hall, supra note 227, at
100-01 ("[T]wo patients can be given exactly the same treatment for which the private
patient receives a large bill not reimbursed by insurance, while the uninsured [public] pa-
tient never sees a bill."). In the Netherlands, fees paid by private insurers to specialist
doctors are nearly twice those paid by the sickness funds. Frederik T. Schut, Health Care
Reform in the Netherlands: Balancing Corporatism, Etatism, and Market Mechanisms, 20
J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 615, 621 (1995).
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sionals or providers. 440 There seems to be, in fact, a worldwide trend
in the recent past towards combining a universal mandatory public
health insurance program with competition among providers for pub-
lic contracts.441 A number of nations, including the United Kingdom,
Chile, and the Netherlands, have been experimenting with innovative
approaches to health care purchasing. 442 By contrast, other nations,
such as Germany, have precluded both private and public payers from
negotiating with individuals or small groups of professionals.
443
Public insurance systems, moreover, have their own intrinsic ad-
vantages. In the end, despite the adoption of extensive and intrusive
market reforms, private markets cannot insure entire populations. To
quote one observer, "The principal shortcoming of individual insur-
ance market reforms in addressing the plight of the uninsured ... is
that all markets discriminate against those who cannot pay."4 Public
insurance systems, by contrast, are in principle more equitable in that
they cover entire populations, and in fact treat different population
groups more equitably as well.445 They usually do a better job of con-
trolling costs, in part because they can impose fixed budgets on at
least some providers.446 They are more accountable to the priorities
44o In the Netherlands, for example, social insurance funds pay general practitioners on
a capitated basis, whereas private insurers pay fee-for-service. AIM, supra note 261, at
142.
441 See generally Richard B. Saltman & Casten von Otter, Planned Markets and Public
Competition: Strategic Reform in Northern European Health S)stems 123-54 (1992) (ex-
ploring objectives, benefits, and administrative framework required to sustain public com-
petition); Wynand P.M.L van de Ven, Market-Oriented Health Care Reforms: Trends
and Future Options, 43 Soc. Sci. & Med. 655 (1996) (indicating such trends).
442 Though these experiments resemble in some respects their American counterparts,
they also reflect the values and politics of their national context. See generally Lawrence
D. Brown, Exceptionalism as the Rule? U.S. Health Policy Innovation and Cross-National
Learning, 23 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 35 (1998) (arguing that other countries adapt, rather
than adopt wholesale, U.S. health care innovations pursuant to their own politico.cultural
milieus); Alan Jacobs, Seeing Difference: Market Health Reform in Europe, 23 J. Health
Pol. Pol'y & L. 1 (1998) (comparing health care market reform in United Kingdom,
Netherlands, and Sweden).
443 Timothy Jost, German Health Care Reform: The Next Steps, 23 J. Health Pol. Pol'y
& L. 697, 706-07 (1998) (explaining that Germany's physician principles of free choice of
unified physician self-governance, as well as structural impediments, stand in way of con-
tracting between doctors and either private or public parties).
444 Hackey, supra note 420, at 215.
445 See, e.g., Adam Wagstaff et al., Equity in Finance of Health Care: Some Further
International Comparisons, 18 J. Health Econ. 263,288-89 (1999) (arguing that health care
is financed most equitably in nations with national health insurance s)stems, followed by
social insurance systems, and then private insurance systems).
446 See Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven, Regulation, Competition and Equity
. With or
Without a Fixed Budget?, in Fixing Health Budgets: Experience from Europe and North
America 63, 64 (Friedrich Wilhelm Schwartz et al. eds., 1996) (proposing that f'ixed budg-
ets seem to be successful as cost containment strategy"). Fixed budgets also create
problems of access and efficiency. See id. at 63-65.
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of the community.447 They are striving to do a better job of providing
public health and preventive health services to communities.
448
Any definitive judgment between public and private financing of
health care must await another day, and perhaps never will be possi-
ble.449 As has already been noted, public programs are far from per-
fect. The British NHS increasingly seems to suffer from
underfunding, which is arguably a risk of any tax-supported program.
It would, however, be interesting to see how the American health care
system would function at NHS funding levels. 450 The German system
seems to be stuck in a political gridlock in which the demands of prov-
iders and of insureds seem ever the more in sharp conflict.
451
Throughout the world, those waiting in queues in public systems seem
increasingly fidgety.
Moreover, even if we conclude that public systems are preferable
to private systems for funding basic health care services, there is still a
role for private health insurance. Private insurance could continue to
play an important role, as in the United Kingdom, Canada, and
France, in supplementing basic public insurance, covering either
nonessential services or perhaps permitting basic care to be obtained
with greater accommodation for patient convenience or choice than is
possible in a public system. 452 As long as basic services are covered in
a public program, a supplementary system arguably could be main-
tained to respond to consumer demands for additional luxury services,
with minimal government regulation.453 In particular, those whose
447 See Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Mar-
ket-Based Health Care Reform, 22 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 427 (1997) (describing process
by which narrow interest groups seek advantage through privatization of health care
system).
448 See Albert F. Wessen, Structural Differences and Health Care Reform, in Health
Care Systems in Transition: An International Perspective 369, 385-86 (Francis D. Powell &
Albert F. Wessen eds., 1999) (describing efforts of examined countries to improve monitor-
ing on part of providers and public health officials, as well as efforts to shift focus from
curative to preventive medicine).
449 As one commentator has noted, "[tjhe insurance market always operates in the
world of the second best." Wortham, supra note 40, at 882.
450 See Lyall, supra note 29, at A20 (alluding to NHS funding problems).
451 See Jost, supra note 443, at 701-04 (delineating events surrounding "political paraly-
sis" with which Germany must grapple in order to realize health care reform).
452 See generally Alessandro Petretto, Optimal Social Health Insurance with Supple-
mentary Private Insurance, 18 J. Health Econ. 727 (1999) (presenting theoretical justifica-
tion for such model). The more perceptive proponents of tax credit subsidies for private
insurance share a similar recognition that all persons should receive basic coverage, regard-
less of ability to pay, with supplemental coverage provided through market transactions.
They argue, however, that basic insurance should be provided through tax-subsidized pri-
vate insurance plans. See Pauly, supra note 47, at 59-66.
453 This precise argument is made by those who focus more on the virtues of private
arrangements, though we might draw a different line as to what services are essential. See
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time is worth a great deal could buy access to care with a shorter wait
or at more convenient times through supplemental insurance. Rates
can be set to accord with risks, and if insurance is unaffordable to
some, their basic health care needs still are covered. Permitting pri-
vate insurance to supplement public systems in poorer countries also
could channel extra money into the health care system, supplementing
the income of health care professionals, financing new health care re-
sources, and taking the pressure off strapped public budgets.
It should be noted, however, that the role of even supplemental
private insurance that duplicates public coverage is hotly debated. A
Canadian court recently upheld Quebec's total ban on private insur-
ance for publicly covered medical costs, recognizing the threat that
private insurance poses to a public insurance system.4 54 If the wealthy
are permitted to opt out of the public system, they may withdraw their
political and financial support from the public system as well, causing
it to wither.455 Allowing a parallel private system leads almost inevita-
bly to increased costs, as funds flow from private as well as public
sources.456 The existence of a parallel private insurance system also
can encourage providers to create artificial shortages and waiting lists
in the public sector to encourage patients to move to the more lucra-
five private sector.457 Even where private insurance merely supple-
ments public coverage, there is the danger that "essential" health care
may be defined even more narrowly as a way of shifting costs from
public to private programs, but leaving those who cannot afford pri-
vate insurance increasingly at risk.45 8
It is not necessary, however, to resolve this debate here. Whether
private insurance as a supplement to public insurance is advisable or
not, private insurance as an alternative means of insuring populations
remains highly problematic.
CONCLUSION
Whether we would be better off with a private or public system of
health care finance is a debate that in the end is of little relevance to
the real-world politics of the United States. The considerable inertia
Hall, supra note 40, at 29 ("Concerns about equity should address how high to set the
social minimum or whether we should have a private system at all.").
454 Chaoulli v. Quebec, No. 500-05-035610-979 (Que. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000).
455 Expert Witness Report of Theodore R. Marmor at 7-9, Chaolli (No. 500-05-035610-
979); McAuley, supra note 257, at 14.
456 Expert Witness Report of Theodore R. Marmor at 9-11, Chaolli (No. 500-05-035610-
979).
457 Id. at 11-13.
458 See Gilmour, supra note 331.
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of the American political system, the generous campaign contribu-
tions available from health insurers,459 and the antigovernment ideo-
logical bent of the American people and their elected politicians
present a phalanx too powerful to be overcome by mere empirical
evidence and reason. The international comparative evidence, how-
ever, tends to show that (1) private insurance markets are in fact very
common, but tend to be highly regulated, and often government subsi-
dized, (2) unregulated competitive individual-purchaser-based mar-
kets for private health insurance are inherently not viable for covering
populations, and exist largely in the nirvanas of libertarian economists
and their think tanks, except where insurance covers supplemental
services, and (3) group insurance markets are more equitable, and
thus less likely to be regulated, than are individual markets.
Given this evidence, we have every reason to proceed cautiously
in embracing policies that would throw more tax money at an ineffi-
cient private insurance system, especially those based on individual
insurance policies. Perhaps if we cannot limit private insurance to the
margins, we might at least consider the creation of marginal public
systems (expanded public hospitals and clinics, for example) that meet
the needs of the uninsured without posing too great a threat to the
private insurance establishment, rather than further expanding public
support for private insurance. 460 Development of this theme, how-
ever, will have to await another article.
459 See, e.g., Health Insurance Industry Campaign Gifts May Break Record, GOP Gets
Biggest Share, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), May 19, 1998, WL 5/19/1998 HCD d3.
460 A number of published analyses also suggest that, in a number of respects, direct
public financing or provision programs are superior to tax credit proposals, though the
comparative advantages of various programs depend heavily on the details of the particu-
lar proposal. One analysis, for example, found that fixed-dollar tax credits (set at $500 per
child) would expand coverage among uninsured children to about the same extent as might
expansion of the CHIP program, but that it would be far less effective at expanding cover-
age of poor children, would have a much greater "crowd out" effect (in that ninety-five
percent of children covered would be previously insured), and would cost several times as
much in public funds. Judith Feder et al., The Difference Different Approaches Make:
Comparing Proposals to Expand Health Insurance 11-16 (1999).
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